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Every year in this country, hundreds of people are convicted of having 
shaken a baby, most often to death. In a prosecution paradigm without 
precedent, expert medical testimony is used to establish that a crime 
occurred, that the defendant caused the infant’s death by shaking, and that 
the shaking was sufficiently forceful to constitute depraved indifference to 
human life. Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) is, in essence, a medical 
diagnosis of murder, one based solely on the presence of a diagnostic 
triad: retinal bleeding, bleeding in the protective layer of the brain, and 
brain swelling.  
New scientific research has cast doubt on the forensic significance of 
this triad, thereby undermining the foundations of thousands of SBS 
convictions. Outside the United States, this scientific evolution has 
prompted systemic reevaluations of the prosecutorial paradigm. In 
contrast, our criminal justice system has failed to absorb the latest 
scientific knowledge. This is beginning to change, yet the response has 
been halting and inconsistent. To this day, triad-based convictions 
continue to be affirmed, and new prosecutions commenced, as a matter of 
course.  
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support of Dean Peter Pitegoff and Dean Glen Weissenberger.  
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This Article identifies a criminal justice crisis and begins a 
conversation about its proper resolution. The conceptual implications of 
the inquiry—for scientific engagement in law’s shadow, for future 
systemic reform, and for our understanding of innocence in a post-DNA 
world—should assist in the task of righting past wrongs and averting 
further injustice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Natalie Beard died on October 16, 1995.
1
 That morning, her mother 
had brought the seven-month-old to the home of her day care provider, 
Audrey Edmunds.
2
 The baby was by all accounts fussy.
3
 According to the 
caregiver‘s account, shortly after the baby was delivered to her, Edmunds 
 
 
 1. State v. Edmunds, 598 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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propped Natalie in her car seat with a bottle,
4
 left the room, and returned a 
half-hour later to discover her limp.
5
 Edmunds—herself a mother—
immediately called 911 to report that Natalie appeared to have choked and 
was unresponsive.
6
 Rescue workers responded minutes later and flew the 
baby to the hospital, where she died that night.
7
 
Prosecutors charged Edmunds with murder based on the theory that 
Natalie had been shaken to death.
8
 No witness claimed to have seen the 
defendant shake the baby.
9
 There were no apparent indicia of trauma.
10
 
Edmunds maintained her innocence throughout.
11
 Yet a jury convicted 
Edmunds on the sole basis of expert testimony that Natalie suffered from 
Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS).
12
 A court sentenced Edmunds to eighteen 
years in prison.
13
  
In important respects, this case falls squarely within the ―shaken baby‖ 
prosecution paradigm that developed in the early 1990s. The infant
14
 had 
no external injuries suggestive of abuse.
15
 The accused
16
 was unable to 
 
 
 4. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 4–5, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2008) (No. 2007AP000933). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. State v. Edmunds, 598 N.W.2d at 293. 
 8. Edmunds was charged with reckless homicide in the first degree, id., which required the 
prosecution to prove that she disregarded an ―unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily 
harm‖ under circumstances evidencing an ―utter disregard for human life,‖ id. at 295. 
 9. Id. at 293–94. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 293. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Emphasizing the lack of any evidence that ―the severe injuries Natalie sustained could have 
been the result of an accident, rather than intentional, forceful conduct, directed specifically at 
Natalie,‖ the appellate court affirmed Edmunds‘s conviction. Id. at 294. After exhausting her state 
remedies, Edmunds petitioned for federal habeas corpus review, which was denied. Edmunds v. 
Deppisch, 313 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 14. The average age of infants diagnosed with SBS is between three months and ten months, 
though children up to three–years-old have been diagnosed. Stephen C. Boos, Abusive Head Trauma 
as a Medical Diagnosis, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, 
AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 49, 50 (Lori Frasier et al. eds., 2006).  
 15. In a typical case, an infant ―is brought to the emergency room with the sudden onset of 
unconsciousness and respiratory irregularities or seizure. The given history suggests sudden and 
unprovoked symptoms . . . [b]ut there is no external evidence to indicate that trauma caused their 
ailment.‖ Id. 
 16. The oft-quoted hierarchy of suspected perpetrators of head injury describes fathers as the 
most likely abusers, followed by mothers‘ boyfriends, and unrelated female babysitters. Id. at 62. 
Regarding the social risk factors for child abuse generally, ―[y]oung unmarried parents, lack of 
education, low socioeconomic status, minority status, and many other risk factors have been shown to 
predict increased child abuse rates. However . . . [a]pplying population variables to individual cases of 
child abuse may be misleading, and has led to the overassessment of minority populations.‖ Id. at 62. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provide an explanation for the child‘s condition.17 The medical evidence 
against the defendant consisted of the three diagnostic symptoms 
comprising the classic ―triad‖: retinal hemorrhages (bleeding of the inside 
surface of the back of the eye); subdural hemorrhages (bleeding between 
the hard outer layer and the spongy membranes that surround the brain); 
and cerebral edema (brain swelling).
18
 The presence of these three signs 
was understood to be pathognomic—or exclusively characteristic—of 
SBS.  
At trial, the prosecution‘s experts testified that ―only shaking, possibly 
accompanied by impact‖ could explain the injuries.19 Regarding the force 
necessary to cause these injuries, jurors heard the explanation typically 
offered in these cases: the force was equivalent to a fall from a second- or 
third-story window, or impact by a car moving at twenty-five to thirty 
miles an hour.
20
 The prosecution‘s experts concluded that the shaking 
necessarily occurred while the baby was in the defendant‘s care, since the 
trauma of the shaking would have caused immediate unconsciousness.
21
 
The scientific basis for SBS was not challenged by the defense.
22
 And 
 
 
 17. See infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 18. Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, at 5. For discussion of the classic SBS triad, see, for 
example, Comm. on Child Abuse and Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Shaken Baby Syndrome: 
Rotational Cranial Injuries—Technical Report, 108 PEDIATRICS 206 (2001); Mary E. Case et al., The 
Nat‘l Ass‘n of Med. Exam‘rs Ad Hoc Comm. on Shaken Baby Syndrome, Position Paper on Fatal 
Abusive Head Injuries in Infants and Young Children, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 112 
(2001). See also Part III.B.1, infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text (elaborating on significance of 
diagnostic triad).  
 19. Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, at 6. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text 
(discussing how shaking is thought to cause triad of symptoms).  
 20.  Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, at 7. According to the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
―[t]he act of shaking leading to shaken baby syndrome is so violent that individuals observing it would 
recognize it as dangerous and likely to kill the child.‖ Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 18, at 206. 
Prosecution experts have often amplified this type of testimony with in-court demonstrations of the 
force believed to be necessary to inflict the brain injuries. For a computerized demonstration of this 
kind see Expert Digital Solutions, Inc., Shaken Baby, http://www.expertdigital. com/shakenbaby.html. 
See infra note 256 (noting reversal of convictions on this basis). But see People v. Mora, 868 N.Y.S.2d 
722, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (trial court ―providently exercised its discretion‖ in allowing 
prosecution‘s expert to ―shake his coat in order to demonstrate the amount of force necessary to inflict 
Shaken Baby Syndrome‖). 
 21. Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, at 8.  
 22. ―Edmunds presented one medical expert witness who agreed with the State‘s witnesses that 
Natalie was violently shaken before her death but who opined that the injury occurred before Natalie 
was brought to Edmunds‘s home.‖ State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 3, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 3. 
Edmunds‘s theory was that one or both of the parents had shaken Natalie the night before her death. 
Edmunds v. Deppisch, 313 F.3d 997, 998 (7th Cir. 2002). This (failure to identify the correct 
perpetrator) has been a common defense in shaken baby prosecutions, as has the argument that, if the 
defendant shook the baby, the shaking did not achieve the level of force necessary to sustain a murder 
conviction. See infra note 181 and accompanying text (describing most common caregiver accounts).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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indeed, at the time of Edmunds‘s trial, the medical consensus on this issue 
was overwhelming.
23
  
All of this is standard fare for an SBS prosecution.
24
 With rare 
exception, the case turns on the testimony of medical experts. Unlike any 
other category of prosecution, all elements of the crime—mens rea and 
actus reus (which includes both the act itself and causation of the resulting 
harm)—are proven by the science. Degree of force testimony not only 
establishes causation, but also the requisite state of mind.
25
 Unequivocal 
testimony regarding timing—i.e., that symptoms necessarily would appear 
instantaneously upon the infliction of injury—proves the perpetrator‘s 
identity. In its classic formulation, SBS comes as close as one could 
imagine to a medical diagnosis of murder: prosecutors use it to prove the 
mechanism of death, the intent to harm, and the identity of the killer.  
Edmunds is a representative shaken baby case in every respect but one. 
On January 31, 2008, Audrey Edmunds was granted a new trial on the 
basis of an evolution in scientific thinking. For the first time, a court 
examining the foundation of SBS concluded that it had become 
sufficiently eroded that a new jury probably would have a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant‘s guilt.26 According to the court, ―a shift in 
mainstream medical opinion‖27 had undermined the basis of the SBS 
diagnosis, raising the distinct possibility that Edmunds, who was still 
serving her eighteen-year sentence in Wisconsin, had done nothing 
whatsoever to harm the child. As is true of an unknown number of 
 
 
 23. State v. Edmunds, No. 96 CF 555, slip op. at 5 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007) (―The medical 
evidence was largely consistent and unchallenged.‖). See Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, at 9 
(discussing unanimity of medical opinions and state‘s reliance on this in argument to jury).  
 24. Once a child protection team has made an SBS diagnosis, suspected perpetrators—those with 
the child when symptoms appeared—are aggressively prosecuted. Each year, an estimated thousand 
plus defendants are convicted, most of murder, annually. Toni Blake, Jury Consultant, Address at the 
Forensic Truth Foundation: When Hypothesis and Data Conflict: An Analysis of an Infant Injury 
Database (May 12–15, 2007) (estimating that 95% of defendants prosecuted in SBS cases are 
convicted and 90% are serving life sentences). 
 25. ―A key component of any expert testimony on SBS involves translating the mechanism of 
trauma into constructs . . . which adequately reflect the mens rea requirements for the charge.‖ Brian 
Holmgren, Prosecuting the Shaken Infant Case, in THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 275, 307 (Stephen Lazoritz & Vincent J. Palusci eds., 2001). As the 
prosecutor in Edmunds argued on summation, ―‗one can only imagine the anger and the intensity of 
the shaking that goes on and the impact that goes on in these cases.‘‖ Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, 
at 8. Evidence of force was thus used to establish that the defendant was reckless and exhibited utter 
disregard for human life.  
 26. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 599. 
 27. Id. at 598–99. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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convictions like it,
28
 the science upon which the defendant‘s conviction 
rested had advanced, raising the specter of innocence.  
This Article explores what ensues when medical certainty underlying 
science-based prosecutions dissipates.
29
 It asks how a scientific revolution 
penetrates the criminal justice system and whether our legal system 
effectively responds to the inevitable consequences of science outpacing 
the law. The remarkable transformation of SBS provides a unique vehicle 
for probing these questions.  
This examination begins in Part II, which places SBS prosecution in 
historical context, exposing the recent and rapid ascendance of a paradigm 
that, until now, has gone largely unnoticed.
30
  
Part III assesses the current scientific controversy. A critical look at the 
creation of SBS exposes a diagnosis flawed from its inception by a tainted 
methodological approach, one, in all likelihood, corrupted by a too-close 
medical-legal nexus.
31
 In recent decades, researchers have uncovered these 
failings, and the diagnosis has evolved accordingly. There is now general 
agreement among the medical community that the previous incarnation of 
SBS is invalid.
32
 The particulars of this evolution are striking—especially 
from a criminal justice standpoint. Despite continued controversy around 
aspects of the diagnosis, Part III identifies a number of key areas where the 
framework for debate itself has been significantly altered. This discussion 
reveals that the new SBS is different enough from what came before to 
raise serious challenges to a substantial number of criminal convictions.  
Specifically, these scientific developments have cast into doubt the 
guilt of an entire category of defendants: those convicted of crimes based 
on a triad-only SBS diagnosis. While we cannot know how many 
convictions are ―unsafe‖ without systematic case review, a comparison of 
the problematic category of SBS convictions to DNA—and other mass 
 
 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. This Article focuses on the criminal justice system‘s treatment of SBS. It should be noted 
that SBS‘s evolution also has powerful family court implications. See, e.g., In re J.S., 785 A.2d 1041 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (affirming removal of two-month-old child and his sibling based on questionable 
SBS diagnosis).  
 30. No legal scholar has attended to the proliferation of SBS prosecutions or explored the strange 
trajectory of SBS in science and law. This project has been given new urgency by mounting challenges 
to the validity of the science upon which these cases rest. At this moment, when new perspectives on 
old science are only just beginning to penetrate the criminal justice system, the emergence of a 
scholarly treatment of SBS and the law is especially critical.  
 31. See infra Part III.A.  
 32. See infra Part III.B.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2009] NEXT INNOCENCE PROJECT 7 
 
 
 
 
exonerations—reveals that this injustice is commensurate with any seen in 
the criminal justice arena to date.
33
  
Part IV chronicles the criminal justice system‘s treatment of the 
changing science. I do so by surveying the various stages in the criminal 
process where actors make decisions with the potential to account for—or 
overlook—scientific developments of the past decade. Police and 
prosecutors investigate cases and prosecutors decide whether to pursue 
charges.
34
 Defendants and prosecutors make Daubert and Frye challenges 
to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
35
 Jurors determine whether guilt 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
36
 Defendants appeal and 
collaterally attack their convictions based on insufficiency of the 
evidence.
37
 And defendants make motions for post-conviction relief 
because new evidence has been discovered.
38
  
This procedural approach to understanding how the law integrates new 
scientific knowledge uncovers a response that is halting and inconsistent. I 
focus my critique on the system‘s treatment of cases in which SBS 
diagnoses rest on outmoded medical dogma. What can be discerned about 
the status quo is alarming. Guilt is being assigned where the best available 
science creates, at the very least, reasonable doubt. When an outcome 
reflecting the best available science is generated, it is not because the 
factual predicate for the prosecution diverges from the typical case but, 
rather, because the defendant is able to mount an aggressive attack—one 
that requires resources—on a body of science whose vulnerability is, in 
theory, equally exposed to all.  
In short, prosecutors and courts are differentially absorbing scientific 
developments, resulting in an arbitrary distribution of justice.
39
 Since 
 
 
 33. See infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.  
 34. See infra Part IV.A. My own intuitions about this phase of the criminal process are informed 
by my experiences prosecuting child abuse cases as an Assistant District Attorney in the Family 
Violence Bureau of the New York County District Attorney‘s Office.  
 35.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 36.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 37.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 38.  See infra Part IV.E. 
 39. The same week Edmunds was decided, an appeals court in Arkansas decided the appeal of 
Samantha Anne Mitchell, an in-home daycare provider for a four-month-old infant. Mitchell v. State, 
No. CACR 07-472, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 98, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008). The baby died of 
what prosecution experts diagnosed as SBS based on the presence of the classic triad of symptoms 
(again, subdural hemorrhaging, brain swelling, and retinal hemorrhages)—the same triad that 
convicted Audrey Edmunds. Id. at *5–6. In terms of the medical findings and the prosecution‘s legal 
theory, the cases are remarkably similar. Yet the very week that Audrey Edmunds was awarded a new 
trial, leading prosecutors in Wisconsin ultimately to dismiss the charges against her, Samantha Anne 
Mitchell‘s murder conviction was affirmed. Id. at *10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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January 31, 2008, when Edmunds‘s new trial motion was granted, dozens 
of convictions based on SBS have been upheld, either on direct appeal or 
collateral attack. An unknown number of prosecutions have been initiated 
and an unknown number resulted in convictions.
40
 While a portion of these 
cases rely on corroborating medical evidence of injury beyond the triad,
41
 
many do not.  
The story of our legal system‘s response to SBS speaks to how crime is 
constructed and reified. It tells of institutional inertia and a quest for 
finality
42
 that sit uneasily with our commitment to justice. And it demands 
consideration of where we go from here. By identifying a problem of 
tragic dimensions, I hope to begin a conversation that seeks solutions and 
situates itself in the emerging discourse on innocence.
43
 The conceptual 
implications of this inquiry—for scientific engagement in law‘s shadow, 
for future systemic reform, and for the notion of innocence in a post-DNA 
world—should assist in the task of righting past wrongs and averting 
further injustice.  
 
 
 40. See, e.g., Shane Anthony, Nanny Should Get 7 Years in Prison, Jury Says Woman, 22, was 
Convicted of Assaulting 4-Month-Old Boy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 30, 2008, at B1; Rebecca 
Baker, Greenburgh Nanny Pleads Guilty in Shaken-Baby Case, THE JOURNAL NEWS (N.Y.), July 30, 
2008, available at http://m.lohud.com/news.jsp?key=110532; Sarah Kapis, Stonewood Father Arrested 
in Shaken Baby Case, W. VA. MEDIA, June 23, 2008, http://www.wboy.com/story.cfm?func=view 
story&storyid=40376; Robert Kerns, Inquest Jury Rules Infant’s Death as Homicide by Shaken Baby 
Syndrome, PEKIN DAILY TIMES (Ill.), June 13, 2008, available at http://www.pekintimes.com/ 
articles/2008/06/13/news5.txt (on file with author); T.C. Mitchell, Father Pleads Guilty to Infant 
Daughter’s Killing, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 11, 2008; Molly Montag, Daycare Provider 
Faces Charges for Injured Infant, SIOUX CITY J., July 3, 2008, available at http://www.siouxcity 
journal.com; Andy Nelesen, Tot Hit Head in Tub, Murder Suspect Tells Police, GREEN BAY PRESS 
GAZETTE, June 20, 2008; Jamaal E. O‘Neal, Man Charged with Felony in Baby’s Injury, LONGVIEW 
NEWS-JOURNAL (Tex.), Aug. 12, 2008, at 1B; Mona Ridder, Grand Jury: Neglect Results in Child’s 
Death, CUMBERLAND TIMES-NEWS, June 25, 2008, available at http://www.times-news.com/local/ 
local_story_177093757.html; Amy Upshaw, Eudora Foster Mother of Dead Toddler Released on 
Bond, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 2008. 
 41. By one nationally prominent defense expert‘s account, one quarter of the cases prosecuted as 
SBS involve a ―battered baby,‖ or a child with substantial medical corroboration of physical abuse. 
Telephone Interview with John Plunkett, Retired Pathologist (June 20, 2008). 
 42. This quest is nicely evidenced by a Connecticut trial court‘s expression of concern in the 
wake of Edmunds: ―the Edmunds case presents a potential quagmire of epic proportions: the strong 
likelihood of constant renewed prosecution and relitigation of criminal charges as expert opinion 
changes and/or evolves over time.‖ Grant v. Warden, No. TSRCV03004233S, 2008 WL 2447272, at 
*1 n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 4, 2008).  
 43. See infra Part V. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2009] NEXT INNOCENCE PROJECT 9 
 
 
 
 
II. THE AGE OF SBS 
The first appeal of an SBS-related conviction was reported in 1984.
44
 
Based on the presence of bilateral retinal hemorrhages and subdural 
hematoma, the prosecution‘s expert concluded that a four-month-old 
infant had been shaken to death,
45
 and the appellate court affirmed the 
sufficiency of the evidence to convict.
46
 Over the next five years, less than 
fifteen appeals of convictions based on an SBS diagnosis were reported.
47
  
Beginning in 1990, however, the number of appeals grew dramatically. 
In five-year increments, published appellate decisions increased from 74 
(January 1, 1990–December 31, 1994), to 160 (January 1, 1995–December 
31, 1999), to 315 (January 1, 2000–December 31, 2004).48 The numbers 
from the first half of the current five-year period suggest that this trend 
toward rising SBS appeals is continuing: from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 
2008, 259 written opinions in this category were issued.
49
  
Appellate case law is admittedly an inadequate measure of 
prosecutions, both because most convictions do not result in a written 
appellate decision,
50
 and because not all prosecutions result in conviction. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the appellate case law can suggest, as it 
does in this instance, that the total volume of prosecutions has been on a 
sharply upward trajectory since 1990.  
Ascertaining the absolute number of SBS prosecutions is of course far 
more difficult.
51
 Approximately 1500 babies are diagnosed with SBS in 
 
 
 44. Ohio v. Schneider, No. L-84-214, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 11988 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 
1984). For an overview of the diagnostic origins of SBS, see infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.  
 45. Schneider, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 11988 at *3–4. At trial, the defense expert cited 
disagreement among scientists as to the quantity of force necessary to produce the observed injuries:  
There are several articles which suggest that just playing with your child and throwing him up and 
down in the air when they are small infants, the reason infants are very risky incidences, they have 
very small bodies and large heads so the head tends to flop back and forth. Many people play with 
their children and throw up and down in the air and there are several experts suggesting that that 
definitely should not occur because it can cause small areas of brain damage and therefore injure 
your child. There really is no real documentation of whether or not a tremendous amount of force 
or several episodes can severely damage an infant.  
Id. at *5. The defendant was convicted by jury of involuntary manslaughter. Id. at *1. 
 46. Id. at *14. 
 47. Based on culling results of search of ―‗shaken baby‘ and convict!‖  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. According to Sam Gross, a leading expert on wrongful convictions, it would be conservative 
to estimate that, in this context, there are at least twice as many trial convictions as appeals, which 
would represent a higher incidence of appeals than average. Telephone Interview with Samuel Gross, 
Thomas and Mabel Long Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. (July 21, 2008).  
 51. Media accounts tell of SBS prosecutions commencing daily across the country. See supra 
note 40. Given the number of SBS diagnoses made each year, see text accompanying infra note 52, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the United States each year.
52
 How many of these cases result in 
prosecution and conviction is unknown, however, since no comprehensive 
data on SBS cases has ever been collected.
53
 That said, there are a number 
of ways to estimate the magnitude of defendants potentially impacted by 
recent scientific developments.
54
 One might conservatively assume that the 
approximately 800 appeals reported since 1990 reflect about 1500 
convictions after trial.
55
 To focus on more recent figures only, it seems fair 
to conclude that around 200 defendants a year are being convicted of 
SBS.
56
 Without additional data, we cannot reasonably speculate about the 
number of defendants who plead guilty to this type of crime,
57
 although 
the estimated 1500 SBS diagnoses a year may provide an outside 
parameter.  
When placed against the backdrop of recent scientific developments, 
these numbers reflect a crisis in the criminal justice system. 
III. SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION 
As a categorical matter, the science of SBS can no longer support a 
finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in triad-only cases
58—cases 
                                                                                                                         
 
this comes as no surprise.  
 52. Blake, supra note 24. See also Nat‘l Shaken Baby Coal., Facts About SBS!!!, http://www. 
shakenbabycoalition.org/facts.htm (last visited July 13, 2009) (―Experts say 1,000–1,500 cases of SBS 
occur each year in the United States, but the true number of cases is unknown because of misdiagnoses 
and underreporting.‖). 
 53. This void has allowed the phenomenal aspects of SBS prosecutions to remain largely 
obscured.  
 54. See infra note 58 (noting that not all SBS convictions have been undermined.); infra note 
143.  
 55. See supra note 50. But national trial consultant Toni Blake has herself been contacted by 
2000 to 3000 lawyers over the past decade regarding assistance with SBS trials and appeals, 
suggesting that the actual number of trial convictions is significantly higher. Mark Anderson, Does 
Shaken Baby Syndrome Really Exist?, DISCOVER, Dec. 2, 2008, http://discovermagazine.com/2008/ 
dec/02-does-shaken-baby-syndrome-really-exist.  
 56. This estimate is based on the number of reported decisions from January 1, 2005 through 
June 30, 2008 (259) and a multiplier of two. See supra note 50 [Sam Gross‘s conservative 
assumption].  
 57. According to Andrea Lyon, a law professor with experience representing clients in SBS 
cases, pleas in this type of prosecution are very much the norm given the likelihood that a jury will 
convict, see infra Part IV.C, and the almost certain harshness of a post-trial sentence. Interview with 
Andrea D. Lyon, Assoc. Dean for Clinical Programs and Clinical Professor of Law, DePaul Univ. 
Coll. of Law, in Chi., Il. (Oct. 16, 2008). A similar sentiment was voiced by one public defender, who 
articulated the dilemma faced by his SBS client: ―if he went to trial and lost, [the sentence] was either 
20 to 50 years, 20 years to life, or life without parole. Agreeing to confess to shaking the child . . . 
would considerably reduce any sentence.‖ Anderson, supra note 55. See infra note 150 (noting 
Ontario‘s Goudge Commission recommendations regarding review of guilty pleas).  
 58. By this, I mean those whose convictions rest exclusively on the presence of retinal 
hemorrhage and/or subdural hematomas. In contrast, a sizeable number of SBS prosecutions rely on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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which represent a significant number of SBS prosecutions. Put simply, 
here ―change has raised the real possibility of past error.‖59  
In the past, the mere presence of retinal hemorrhaging, subdural 
hematoma, and cerebral edema was taken to mean that a baby had been 
shaken hard enough to produce what were conceptualized as whiplash 
forces.
60
 According to the conventional understanding of SBS,
61
 ―[t]he 
application of rotational acceleration and deceleration forces to the infant‘s 
head causes the brain to rotate in the skull. Abrupt deceleration allows 
continuing brain rotation until bridging veins are stretched and ruptured, 
causing a thin layer of subdural haemorrhage on the surface of the 
brain.‖62 Retinal hemorrhages were thought to result from a similar causal 
mechanism.
63
 Most significantly, the triad of symptoms was believed to be 
distinctly characteristic—in scientific terms, pathognomonic—of violent 
shaking.
64
 
Despite its lingering presence in the popular imagination, the scientific 
underpinnings of SBS have crumbled over the past decade
65
 as the medical 
establishment has deliberately discarded a diagnosis defined by shaking.
66
 
Although no single nomenclature has emerged in its place,
67
 doctors are 
now in widespread agreement that SBS is an unhelpful characterization,
68
 
                                                                                                                         
 
corroborative evidence beyond the triad; convictions which result in these cases are therefore less 
dramatically undermined by recent scientific developments. See infra note 143. It should be noted that 
what constitutes real, as opposed to apparent, ―corroboration‖ in SBS cases is often a difficult 
question. See infra notes 80–82, 181–90 and accompanying text (challenging validity of perpetrator 
―confessions‖); infra note 146 (critiquing United Kingdom Attorney General‘s definition of 
corroboration). See also Stein v. Eberlin, No. 1:07CV3696, 2009 WL 650363 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 
2009) (defense expert opined that ―parietal cranial irregularities in the victim‘s skull likely represent 
suture variants rather than fractures‖); P. Weir et al., Normal Skull Suture Variant Mimicking 
Intentional Injury, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 1020 (2006). Nevertheless, this Article focuses on those cases 
predicated on the ―pure triad,‖ or triad-only prosecutions. 
 59. STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 531 
(Ontario Ministry of the Att‘y Gen. 2008) (on file with author). 
 60. See, e.g., John Caffey, On the Theory and Practice of Shaking Infants, 124 AM. J. DISEASES 
CHILDREN 161 (1972); Mary E. Case et al., supra note 18. 
 61. The term ―came into general usage in the 1980s.‖ Robert Reece, What Are We Trying to 
Measure: The Problems of Case Ascertainment, 34 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S116 (2008).  
 62. Brian Harding, R. Anthony Risdon, & Henry F. Krous, Letter, Shaken Baby Syndrome, 328 
BRIT. MED. J. 720, 720 (2004).  
 63. Id. 
 64. See infra Part III.A. 
 65. See infra Part III.B.  
 66. See infra Part III.B.3. This move away from etiological diagnosis toward anatomical 
diagnosis reflects a key concession to the limits of medical science. Telephone Interview with Stephen 
Boos, Dep‘t of Pediatrics, Armed Forces Ctr. for Child Prot., Nat‘l Naval Med. Ctr. (June 17, 2008).  
 67. Reece, supra note 61, at S116 (noting ―lack of common nomenclature‖). 
 68. ―SBS‖ has been supplanted by a number of different terms: shaken impact syndrome (SIS); 
inflicted childhood neurotrauma; abusive head trauma (AHT); inflicted traumatic brain injury 
(inflicted TBI); and non-accidental head injury (NAHI). Reece, supra note 61. Indeed, the Committee 
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and that the presence of retinal hemorrhages and subdural hematoma 
cannot conclusively prove that injury was inflicted.
69
 
Although it may be tempting to conclude simply that ―science 
evolves,‖ and leave the inquiry there, the story is more complex; an object 
lesson in scientific overreaching and the challenge of correction. 
A. Flawed Science 
A number of forces coalesced to transform SBS from a certain 
diagnosis into its current state of flux. Most importantly, in the mid- to 
late-1990s,
70
 medical research, including the SBS literature, became 
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. The new ―evidence-based 
medicine‖ standards required doctors to derive their research from 
methods that are scientific and statistically rigorous.
71
 The change 
triggered a review of the evidence supporting a number of areas of 
medicine,
72
 and included a comprehensive effort to examine the science 
underlying SBS.
73
  
The application of the evidence-based framework to the SBS literature 
resulted in a remarkable determination: the medical literature published 
prior to 1998 contained ―inadequate scientific evidence to come to a firm 
conclusion on most aspects of causation, diagnosis, treatment, or any other 
matters pertaining to SBS.‖74 More specifically, ―[s]erious data gaps, flaws 
of logic, [and] inconsistency of case definition‖ meant that ―the commonly 
held opinion that the finding of SDH [subdural hematoma] and RH [retinal 
                                                                                                                         
 
on Child Abuse and Neglect of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recently recommended 
that ―[p]ediatricians should use the term ‗abusive head trauma‘ rather than a term that implies a single 
injury mechanism, such as shaken baby syndrome.‖ Cindy Christian et al., Abusive Head Trauma in 
Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1411 (2009). Notwithstanding this proliferation of 
alternative diagnostic labels and the AAP‘s newly articulated recommendation, both the medical and 
legal establishments continue to employ the terminology of SBS. For the sake of clarity, I will do so 
here as well. 
 69. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 70. ―1998/1999 is regarded as the turning point in acceptance of the tenets and practice of EBM.‖ 
Mark Donohoe, Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome: Part I: Literature Review, 
1966–1998, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 239, 239 (2003).  
 71. Testimony of Patrick Barnes in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day One) at 17–19, State 
v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2008) (No. 96 DF 555) [hereinafter Barnes testimony, 
Evidentiary Hearing (Day One)]. See Donohoe, supra note 70, at 239 (―In recent years, there has been 
a clear move toward basing medical practice and opinions on the best available medical and scientific 
evidence.‖).  
 72. Donohoe, supra note 70, at 239. 
 73. Id. at 241. 
 74. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2009] NEXT INNOCENCE PROJECT 13 
 
 
 
 
hemorrhage] in an infant was strong evidence of SBS was 
unsustainable.‖75  
A logical fallacy of profound importance was uncovered by a close 
examination of the pre-1999 SBS literature: researchers had chosen 
subjects for study based on the presence of subdural hematomas and 
retinal hemorrhages and, with little or no investigation into other possible 
causes of these symptoms, simply concluded that the infants were 
shaken.
76
 Scientists accordingly inferred that subdural hematomas and 
retinal hemorrhages must necessarily result from shaking.
77
 Put 
differently, researchers ―select[ed] cases by the presence of the very 
clinical findings and test results they [sought] to validate as diagnostic. 
Not surprisingly, such studies tend[ed] to find their own case selection 
criteria pathognomonic of SBS.‖78 The circularity of this logic is 
represented by the following equation: ―SBS = SDH + RH [inclusion 
criteria], therefore SDH + RH = SBS [conclusion].‖79  
Other studies purporting to support the validity of the SBS diagnosis 
relied on ―confessions‖ to establish the mechanism of injury. Here, too, a 
number of problems undermined the validity of the research.
80
 Putting 
aside momentarily the possibility that a suspected abuser would be less 
than candid with doctors and investigators,
81
 the classification of an 
account as a confession in these studies was highly problematic from a 
 
 
 75. Id. As defenders of the scientific research are quick to note, there are obvious ―difficulties in 
performing experiments in this area,‖ since ―[i]t is clearly unethical to intentionally shake infants to 
induce trauma.‖ Id. at 239. 
 76. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 28–29. ―The major 
criticism of those who would indict and convict based on one or two talismanic findings of ‗shaken 
baby syndrome‘ is that the justification for their opinions is based on nothing but circular reasoning.‖ 
Thomas L. Bohan, Letter to Editor, Evaluating Evidence, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 30, 2005.  
 77. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 28–29.  
 78. Donohoe, supra note 70, at 239. As Dr. Patrick Barnes, chief of pediatric neuroradiology at 
Stanford‘s Children‘s Hospital and a leading national expert in this area, has explained, ―we as a group 
that wrote those papers assumed what we were concluding.‖ Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing 
(Day One), supra note 71, at 27–28. According to Dr. Barnes‘s testimony, he—along with many other 
scientists—‖told a lie on child abuse based on old diagnostic criteria.‖ Id. at 70–71. He has since made 
every effort to correct his past mistakes. Interview with Thomas Bohan, President, Am. Acad. of 
Forensic Scis., in Peaks Island, Me. (June 11, 2008). Telephone Interview with John Plunkett, supra 
note 41.  
 79. Patrick D. Barnes, Imaging of the Central Nervous System in Suspected or Alleged 
Nonaccidental Injury, Including the Mimics, 18 TOPICS MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 53, 55 
(2007). ―The evidence for SBS appears analogous to an inverted pyramid, with a small database (most 
of it poor-quality original research, retrospective in nature, and without appropriate control groups) 
spreading to a broad body of somewhat divergent opinions.‖ Donohoe, supra note 70, at 239. 
 80. Jan E. Leestma, ―Shaken Baby Syndrome”: Do Confessions by Alleged Perpetrators Validate 
the Concept?, 11 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 14 (2006).  
 81. See infra notes 181–90 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator accounts).  
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methodological perspective: ―where caretakers said that they shook the 
baby, it was never detailed how much they shook the baby, how long they 
shook the baby, and did the baby‘s symptoms precede the shaking or did 
they follow the shaking.‖82  
Once the edifice upon which SBS had been constructed cracked, 
researchers began looking beyond the child abuse literature to the 
expertise of neurosurgeons, biomechanical engineers,
83
 and pathologists.
84
 
Knowledge gained from these disciplines further eroded confidence in the 
existence of a pathognomonic relationship between shaking and the SBS 
triad.
85
  
Around the same time, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
revolutionized the field of radiology and significantly altered the 
diagnostic universe.
86
 Compared to its precursor, computed tomography 
(CT), MRI enabled a far more detailed assessment of the ―pattern, extent, 
and timing‖ of central nervous system injuries.87 New radiological 
findings challenged what had become akin to scientific gospel,
88
 revealing 
the presence of triad symptoms in the ―mimics‖ of abuse: accidental injury 
and medical disorders manifesting as SBS.
89
 And as technology and 
scientific methodology advanced, researchers questioning the basis for 
SBS reached a critical mass.
90
 
 
 
 82. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 31. One expert has 
remarked that it is not surprising that a caregiver would shake a child found unconscious, both because 
this response is almost instinctual and because the medical establishment once instructed that ―if you 
have an unresponsive child, one of the first things you do is you jiggle or shake them and see if they 
will respond.‖ Id. See also infra notes 181–90 and accompanying text [same as above]. Cf. Hess v. 
Tilton, No. CIV S-07-0909WBSEFBP, 2009 WL 577661 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009) (defendant 
―admitted that he shook [the baby] but insisted it was only in an attempt to clear her throat because she 
was choking on her own vomit‖). 
 83. Biomechanical research has practical application to ―child safety, car seats, [and] playground 
equipment. . . .‖ Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 25.  
 84. Id. at 24–25. Although ―much of [this] literature was available before 1998, [it] was not 
widely read or applied by the child protection teams . . . and, particularly, the forensic pediatricians 
. . . .‖ Id. at 25. 
 85. Id. at 24–25. 
 86. Id. at 26, 115. 
 87. Patrick D. Barnes, Ethical Issues in Imaging Nonaccidental Injury: Child Abuse, 13 TOPICS 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 85, 89 (2002); see also Marguerite M. Caré, Neuroradiology, in 
ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 
#, 89 (Lori Frasier et al. eds., 2006). 
 88. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 26. 
 89. Id. at 23, 52–53. See infra notes 132–36 and accompanying text (discussing SBS mimics).  
 90. Interview with Thomas Bohan, supra note 78. For an interesting discussion of the ―critical 
role that groups play in social epidemics,‖ see Power of Context (Part Two), in MALCOLM GLADWELL, 
THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 169, 171 (Little, Brown and 
Co. 2000).  
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This momentum was catalyzed by the high-profile prosecution of 
British au pair Louise Woodward, which in 1997 brought shaken baby 
syndrome into the international spotlight.
91
 The case was widely perceived 
as ―one of the more intriguing legal dramas of the age—one that [left] 
unresolved a mystery of sickening fascination to parents everywhere.‖92 In 
its wake, an already divided scientific community became even more 
polarized. Physicians felt ―compelled to speak out regarding the scientific 
evidence as portrayed in the trial of Louise Woodward,‖ contending that 
―media publicity surrounding the case has led to considerable sentiment 
that she was convicted despite allegedly irrefutable scientific evidence 
presented by the defense that the infant‘s injuries had occurred days to 
weeks earlier.‖93 And critics of the SBS diagnosis were galvanized by a 
legal and symbolic victory that commanded the world‘s attention.  
In response to these developments, an uneasy equilibrium has been 
reached. Once considered a ―fringe‖ group, scientists challenging the SBS 
dogma have emerged as a significant force in terms of numbers as well as 
influence. Meanwhile, rather than abandon it altogether, defenders of the 
 
 
 91. Commonwealth v. Woodward, No. CRIM. 97-0433, 1997 WL 694119, at *1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 10, 1997). The defendant called 911 to report that she could not rouse eight-month-old Matthew 
Eappen from his nap. Debra Rosenberg & Evan Thomas, ‗I Didn’t Do Anything‘, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 
10, 1997, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/97361. Doctors found massive intracranial 
bleeding, brain swelling, and a retinal hemorrhage, and Matthew later died. Nanny Murder Trial—Jury 
Still Out, BBC NEWS, Oct. 30, 1997, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_ 
own_correspondent/16726.stm. The prosecution, as is typical in SBS cases, rested almost entirely on 
medical evidence. Experts testified that ―‗there was no doubt . . . that this infant was a victim of shaken 
baby syndrome;‘‖ and that this was ―‗a classic picture of acute shaken baby injury.‘‖ Id. 
 The defense challenged the science more aggressively—and far more publicly—than had ever 
been done before. See id. (describing ―clash of the medical men‖ in which ―[b]oth teams produced ‗the 
world‘s leading experts‘ to make their own case‖). Woodward was represented by Barry Scheck, one 
of the nation‘s preeminent defense attorneys, whose advocacy proved the difference that resources can 
make. See Rosenberg & Thomas, supra (―Scheck and his team hired medical experts (at the cost of 
thousands of dollars a day) who testified that Matthew‘s skull fracture had occurred about three weeks 
before he died, and that the fatal bleeding could have been unleashed by just a slight jar.‖). The 
defense presented a number of experts to testify to an alternative theory of Matthew‘s death. 
According to this testimony, the fatal hemorrhage was caused by a ―re-bleed‖ of a chronic brain clot 
resulting from an undetected injury. Woodward, 1997 WL 694119, at *1. See infra note 194 (citing 
supporting re-bleed theory). The trial ―roil[ed] two nations.‖ Rosenberg & Thomas, supra. After a jury 
convicted the defendant of murder, the trial judge reduced the verdict to involuntary manslaughter and 
sentenced Woodward to time already served. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 
(Mass. 1998). In his order, the judge articulated one rational view of the evidence which would 
constitute manslaughter: the baby had a chronic blood clot which re-bled upon ―rough‖ handling by 
Woodward. Id. at 1287. 
 92. Rosenberg & Thomas, supra note 91.  
 93. David L. Chadwick et al., Letter to the Editor, Shaken Baby Syndrome—A Forensic Pediatric 
Response, 101 PEDIATRICS 321, 321 (1998). 
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validity of the diagnosis have adapted it in subtle but important ways: SBS 
has been reincarnated to reflect a shifted consensus.
94
  
B. Shifted Consensus 
Since the mid-1990s, the science surrounding SBS has undergone a 
striking transformation. With little attention outside of the medical 
community, universally held tenets have been undermined, leading a 
segment of the scientific establishment—including some formerly 
prominent supporters of its validity—to perceive the diagnosis as 
illegitimate. Others, equally distinguished in their respective fields, have 
responded to the new research by defending SBS against attack.
95
 Thus, 
despite the progression of scientific discourse, the current debate about 
shaken baby syndrome is remarkably polarized.
96
 Scientists on each side 
of the controversy espouse their respective views with a passion and 
certainty matched in intensity by that of their opponents.
97
  
This polarization, and the bitterness that accompanies it, can tend to 
obscure a significant area of consensus that has developed around the 
invalidity of previously accepted dogma. Doctors who defend the 
legitimacy of SBS and dismiss many of its critics‘ attacks are willing to 
concede that the science has evolved—and that even mainstream thinking 
has changed in a number of areas. The testimony of prosecution experts 
marks this movement.
98
  
The movement is subtle, but undeniable. Its significance may depend 
upon the context in which it is being evaluated. From the perspective of 
―pure‖ science, the similarities between the two factions may be 
overshadowed by their unresolved differences;
99
 but in the criminal justice 
 
 
 94. Defenders of the new SBS adhere to the view that the cluster of triad symptoms, while not 
pathognomonic of abuse, are generally indicative of violent shaking and/or impact. See infra notes 
107–09 and accompanying text.  
 95. Defenders of the validity of the diagnosis fall along a spectrum. For instance, without 
rejecting the construct in its entirety, many physicians have revised their thinking about the original or 
―strong‖ version of SBS—i.e., the syndrome defined by a triad of symptoms understood to be 
pathognomonic of shaking. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 96. See infra notes 109, 113, 123, 128–29 and accompanying text.  
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., Testimony of William Perloff in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day Four) at 
11–12, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (2008) (No. 96 CF 555); Testimony of Betty Spivak in 
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day Three) at 12–14, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (2008) 
(No. 96 CF 555) [hereinafter Spivak testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day Three)]. 
 99. Evaluating this claim is complicated, given that the notion of ―pure science‖ in the domain of 
SBS may well be a fiction.  
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setting, the new common ground should be of critical importance. A brief 
overview of what has become uncontroversial reveals why.  
1. The Myth of Pathognomony 
An emerging body of research has undermined the scientific basis for 
defining the triad of SBS symptoms as exclusively diagnostic of abuse.
100
 
No longer are physicians willing to state with certainty that the 
constellation of symptoms that once characterized SBS individually
101
 and 
collectively
102
 must in every case indicate that a child was abused.
103
 In 
particular, as scientific study has generated new explanations for the 
presence of subdural hematomas
104
 and retinal hemorrhages,
105
 doctors 
have become increasingly reluctant to use the word pathognomonic when 
discussing these symptoms.
106
 While many disagree vehemently with the 
contention that shaking alone cannot possibly cause the diagnostic triad,
107
 
they have conceded that the triad is not necessarily induced by shaking, 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., J. Plunkett and J.F. Geddes, Letter, The Evidence Base for Shaken Baby Syndrome, 
328 BRIT. MED. J. 719, 720 (2004) (urging ―reconsider[ation of] the diagnostic criteria, if not the 
existence, of shaken baby syndrome‖). 
 101. In cases, the presence of subdural hematoma or retinal hemorrhage alone has provided the 
basis for an SBS diagnosis. Id. at 719. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (describing 
prosecutions of this kind).  
 102. See Clinical Statement of American Academy of Opthamology, http://one.aao.org/CE/ 
PracticeGuidelines/ClinicalStatements_Content.aspx?cid=c379ec3e-8251-48e6-a88e-fb6f37954b14 
(last visited July 20, 2009). 
 103. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 104. See, e.g., Marta C. Cohen & Irene Scheimberg, Evidence of Occurrence of Intradural and 
Subdural Hemorrhage in the Perinatal and Neonatal Period in the Context of Hypoxic Ischemic 
Encephalopathy, 12 PEDIATRIC DEVELOPMENTAL PATHOLOGY 169 (2009); Julie Mack et al., Anatomy 
and Development of the Meninges: Implications for Subdural Collections and CSF Circulation, 39 
PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 200 (2009) (on file with author); Eva Lai Wah Fung et al., Unexplained 
Subdural Hematoma in Young Children: Is it Always Child Abuse?, 44 PEDIATRICS INT‘L 37 (2002); 
V.J. Rooks et al., Prevalence and Evolution of Intracranial Hemorrhage in Asympotomatic Term 
Infants, 29 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 1082 (2008).  
 105. See, e.g., P.E. Lantz et al., Perimacular Retinal Folds from Childhood Head Trauma, 328 
BRIT. MED. J. 754 (2004); Gregg T. Leuder et al., Permacular Retinal Folds Simulating Nonaccidental 
Injury in an Infant, 124 ARCHIVES OPHTHAMOLOGY 1782 (2006).  
 106. There has been widespread acknowledgment that what one researcher has called ―the 
proposed pathognomonic association between unexplained subdural hematoma/retinal hemorrhages 
and child abuse‖ may be suspect. Fung et al., supra note 104, at 37 (adopting a cross-cultural 
perspective and concluding that the diagnosis may be a ―self-fulfilling prophecy‖). This concession 
has been articulated by even those physicians who maintain the validity of the diagnosis. Interview 
with Lawrence Ricci, Dir., Spurwink Child Abuse Program, in Portland, Me. (June 12, 2008); 
Telephone Interview with Stephen Boos, supra note 66. See also C. Smith & J. Bell, Shaken Baby 
Syndrome: Evidence and Experts, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 6, 7 (2008) 
(arguing that ―trauma remains the most likely cause of SDH [subdural hemorrhage] in infancy‖ while 
―stress[ing] that the triad is not pathognomonic of inflicted injury‖).  
 107. See infra Part III.B.3.  
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and that a differential diagnosis must be considered.
108
 This represents a 
dramatic evolution in mainstream scientific thinking.  
Critics of the new research argue that shaking is still the most likely 
explanation for retinal hemorrhaging and subdural hematoma.
109
 
Nevertheless, given that the diagnostic paradigm rests fully on the triad, 
the move away from pathognomony inevitably reframes ongoing debate.  
2. Lucid Intervals 
In the past, defendants prosecuted for SBS were identified by the 
science—that is, by the certainty of doctors that the perpetrator of abuse 
was necessarily the person with the infant immediately prior to the loss of 
consciousness. However, studies have since shown that children suffering 
fatal head injury may be lucid for more than seventy-two hours before 
death.
110
 Because the prospect of a lucid interval lessens the ability to 
pinpoint when an injury was inflicted, this research dramatically alters the 
forensic landscape. Without other evidence, the identity of a perpetrator—
assuming a crime has occurred—simply cannot be established.111  
Similarly, whereas before, doctors effectively foreclosed the possibility 
that prior accidental injury caused an infant‘s later symptoms, lucid 
interval studies support the notion of a lag time.
112
 
Those who dispute the importance of this research note that the concept 
of lucidity is ambiguous and argue that, even in an interval classified as 
lucid, an infant suffering from fatal head trauma would show signs of 
severe neurological damage.
113
 At least one documented case—where a 
hospitalized child was observed by medical personnel in a ―clingy, but 
 
 
 108. In SBS cases, the differential diagnosis is a list of possible causes of the infant‘s symptoms. 
It results from a methodology that seeks to eliminate those factors that cannot have contributed to the 
injuries. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 12, 32. For further 
discussion of the differential diagnosis, see infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 109. This perspective was articulated repeatedly in my conversations with physicians. It is also 
represented in the scientific literature. See, e.g., David L. Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death 
Resulting from Short Falls Among Young Children: Less than 1 in 1 Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213 
(2008). 
 110. See, e.g., M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval Duration Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in 
Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 723 (1998); Kristy 
B. Arbogast et al., In Reply to Letter to Editor, Initial Neurologic Presentation in Young Children 
Sustaining Inflicted and Unintentional Fatal Head Injuries, 116 PEDIATRICS 1608 (2005).  
 111. See infra note 250 (noting, among others, cases where identity is in dispute).  
 112. See supra note 110. 
 113. Interview with Lawrence Ricci, supra note 106; Spivak testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day 
Three), supra note 98, at 94–102.  
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perfectly responsive‖ state for sixteen hours before her death114—has 
proven otherwise.
115
  
But here, again, the emerging consensus dwarfs the continuing 
disagreement.
116
 A period of time can exist where a child is impaired but 
functioning,
117
 making the lucid interval ―a distinct discomforting but real 
possibility.‖118 In the past, caregiver accounts of seemingly unprecipitated 
neurological crises were dismissed or even deemed inculpatory.
119
 These 
accounts must now be evaluated with the possibility of a lucid interval in 
mind.  
3. Removing the Shaking from the Syndrome 
New debate has emerged regarding whether shaking can generate the 
force levels sufficient to cause the injuries associated with SBS. Those 
who believe it cannot point to a number of biomechanical studies, as well 
as research using animal and computer models.
120
 Many of these scientists 
assume arguendo that rotational acceleration-deceleration forces can, in 
theory, cause retinal hemorrhage and subdural hematoma, but contend that 
shaking an infant with sufficient force to do so would necessarily damage 
 
 
 114. Testimony of Robert Huntington in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day Two) at 36, State 
v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (2008) (No. 96 CF 555) [hereinafter Huntington testimony, Evidentiary 
Hearing (Day Two)].  
 115. See Robert Huntington, Letter, Symptoms Following Head Injury, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. 
& PATHOLOGY 105 (2002) (describing case study in which infant was observed by hospital personnel 
in prolonged lucid state before dying from injuries associated with SBS). This case (―Hernandez‖) had 
a transformative effect on Dr. Huntington, the pathologist who performed the autopsy in Edmunds. At 
trial, Dr. Huntington testified that it was ―highly probable‖ that Natalie had been injured within two 
hours of being seen by medical personnel. Huntington testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day Two), 
supra note 114, at 33. Based on his subsequent involvement with the Hernandez case, Dr. Huntington 
testified on behalf of Edmunds at her 2007 post-conviction evidentiary hearing that he had ―changed 
[his] opinion about whether there could be a significant lucid interval after injury[.]‖ Id. at 34. See 
infra Part IV.E.1. Although Hernandez is factually sui generis, ―everybody agrees that the single 
incident, the single validated case can falsify a theory. That‘s what‘s significant about them.‖ Attorney 
for the Defense in Transcript of Oral Argument (Day 5) at 132–33, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2007) (No. 96 CF 555).  
 116. There seems to be general agreement in the medical community that, in nonlethal cases, 
where a child typically presents as lucid, the science can even less readily identify a perpetrator. 
Interview with Ricci, supra note 106; Telephone Interview with Stephen Boos, supra note 66.  
 117. Experts may debate whether the exhibiting signs were so severe that medical professionals 
would have been aware of a problem, but this does not equate to what a nonmedical person would 
necessarily conclude—which, for purposes of evaluating a caregiver history, would seem to be the 
relevant inquiry.  
 118. Huntington testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day Two), supra note 114, at 44.  
 119. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. See also Part IV.A.2. 
 120. See, e.g., A.C. Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical, Pathological, and 
Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409 (1987); A.K. Ommaya et al., Biomechanics and 
Neuropathology of Adult and Paediatric Head Injury, 16 BRIT. J. NEUROSURGERY 220 (2002).  
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the neck and cervical spinal cord or column. Since most infants diagnosed 
with SBS do not present this type of injury,
121
 they could not have been 
simply shaken.
122
  
This perspective remains subject to considerable criticism within the 
medical establishment.
123
 But even those who vehemently dispute the 
conclusion that shaking alone cannot cause the triad have revised their 
thinking. No longer is shaking advanced as an exclusive etiology.
124
 
Instead, the current position of this group of physicians with respect to 
nonnatural forces (i.e., intentional or accidental trauma) is that either 
shaking or impact may cause the classic triad.
125
 More important is the 
widespread recognition that the two possible mechanisms cannot be 
clinically differentiated. Thus, the most committed defenders of the 
validity of the SBS diagnosis now allow that impact cannot be eliminated 
as a potential causal mechanism.  
Once this fact is acknowledged, the question of how much force is 
required to generate the types of injury associated with SBS becomes 
critical to whether trauma was inflicted, accidental, or undeterminable. 
 
 
 121. ―As forensic pathologists are keenly aware, neck injuries in a ‗shaken‘ child are a rarity, not a 
commonality.‖ Kimberley Molina, Neck Injuries and Shaken Baby Syndrome, 30 AM. J. FORENSIC 
MED. & PATHOLOGY 89 (2009) (citing data presented at Annual Meeting of the National Association 
of Medical Examiners indicating 0% incidence of neck injuries in seventy-nine potential ―shaking‖ 
cases).  
 122. See, e.g., Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Biomechanics Analysis of Injury 
Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC SCI. INT‘L 71 (2005). 
 123. Among those who believe that shaking can cause the constellation of SBS injuries, some are 
willing to concede that this has not been scientifically proven. These physicians posit that the absence 
of proof is a reflection of poor modeling, rather than anatomical impossibility. They also note that 
researchers are obviously unable to shake live babies (and ethical considerations prevent this kind of 
experiment on animals that would be useful for comparison). According to those who adhere to the 
notion that shaking may result in the diagnostic triad, these realities make it extremely difficult to 
prove the causal mechanism involved in SBS. Telephone Interview with Stephen Boos, supra note 66; 
Interview with Lawrence Ricci, supra note 106.  
 Along these same lines, in the past, doctors were certain, not only that shaking was the mechanism 
at issue, but also that the shaking necessary to cause the triad of symptoms associated with SBS was of 
such an extremely forceful nature that the causal act could not be anything other than abuse. To 
illustrate the point, doctors compared the hypothesized forces at issue to known causes of subdural 
hematoma and retinal hemorrhage—i.e., falls off of multi-story buildings and car crashes—and they 
modeled this violent shaking with baby dolls. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. Today, 
confronting the absence of a solid scientific basis for these claims, and in recognition of the logic that 
such extreme force might be expected to cause neck and cervical cord injury, the conventional wisdom 
regarding degree of force has been disavowed. Telephone Interview with Stephen Boos, supra note 66; 
Interview with Lawrence Ricci, supra note 106. Disagreement continues, however, regarding whether 
this type of injury is always clinically discernable. 
 124. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text (describing original formulation of SBS 
diagnosis). 
 125. Telephone Interview with Stephen Boos, supra note 66; Interview with Lawrence Ricci, 
supra note 106. See also Duhaime, supra note 120. 
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The latest thinking about force thresholds complicates this inquiry. New 
research shows that relatively short-distance falls may cause fatal head 
injury that looks much like the injury previously diagnosed as SBS.
126
 
Moreover, these signs and symptoms may not appear immediately.
127
  
While the ―short-fall‖ literature continues to be a source of debate128 
and its scientific significance minimized by some,
129
 the potential impact 
of these findings on criminal prosecutions is enormous.
130
 Where doctors 
would previously have been certain that an infant was shaken, in many 
cases
131
 a fall must now be entertained as an explanation for injuries.
132
 
Once the threshold of force sufficient to cause the injuries at issue has 
been cast into doubt, scientific identification of a causal mechanism that is 
 
 
 126. ―The injury may be associated with bilateral retinal hemorrhage, and an associated subdural 
hematoma. . . .‖ John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls, 22 AM. 
J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1, 10 (2001). See generally Scott Denton, Delayed Sudden Death in 
an Infant Following an Accidental Fall: A Report with Review in the Literature, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC 
MED. & PATHOLOGY 239 (2003).  
 127. Id. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 128. See, e.g., Robert M. Reece, Letter, The Evidence Base for Shaken Baby Syndrome: Response 
to Editorial from 106 Doctors, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1316 (2004).  
 129. See, e.g., Testimony of Jeffrey Jentzen, in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day Three) at 
30–35, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (2008) (No. 96 CF 555). Other physicians, even those who 
generally testify on behalf of the prosecution in SBS cases, have conceded the importance of the short-
falls findings. See, e.g., Testimony of Alex Levin in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day Four) at 
133, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2008) (No. 96 CF 555) (characterizing this 
research as ―valuable addition to the literature‖).  
 130. The implications of this research extend beyond traditional SBS prosecutions. For instance, 
in Texas, one death row inmate, Cathy Lynn Henderson, was recently granted a stay of execution and 
a hearing on her habeas motion based on newly available scientific evidence regarding the effects of 
short falls on pediatric head trauma. Ex parte Henderson, 246 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). At 
her trial in 1995, Henderson claimed that she had accidentally dropped the infant from her arms—a 
contention effectively rebutted by the testimony of prosecution experts, who unanimously concluded 
that the infant‘s extensive brain injuries must necessarily have been caused by intentionally slamming 
of the head against a hard surface. Id. at 691. The certainty attending this conclusion has since been 
undermined by the short-fall literature, as evidenced by the affidavits and reports submitted by the 
defendant in support of her motion for habeas relief. Id. Most notably, the medical examiner who 
testified for the prosecution ―in essence, recant[ed] his trial-time conclusive opinion‖ as a result of the 
―new scientific information‖ not available when Henderson was convicted of capital murder. Id. at 
692. As this Article goes to print, the trial court has not yet ruled on an evidentiary hearing held earlier 
this year.  
 131. To be clear, falls are not the only alternative explanation for the SBS triad. See infra notes 
134–36 and accompanying text (discussing natural causes). Depending on the case—in particular, the 
available physical/forensic evidence (or lack thereof) and the caregiver‘s account—a fall may be more 
or less likely than other possible causes of injury.  
 132. Infants‘ heads may encounter impact in a variety of ways: babies fall from high chairs, beds 
and stairs; babies are accidentally dropped. ―A history by the caretaker that the child may have fallen 
cannot be dismissed.‖ Plunkett, supra note 126, at 10. Given the frequency with which caregivers offer 
a fall as explanation for the child‘s injuries, see infra note 181, this scientific development has real 
criminal justice significance.  
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abusive
133
 becomes problematic. Put differently, the medical testimony 
can no longer do the work of establishing mens rea.  
Just as researchers have identified the possibility of accidental trauma 
as a cause of the SBS triad, so, too, has increasing attention been given to 
of a number of nontraumatic causes of symptoms previously assumed to 
be pathognomonic of shaking.
134
 A ―number of medical disorders 
documented in the medical peer-reviewed literature . . . can mimic 
[abusive head trauma],‖ including congenital malformations, metabolic 
disorders, hematological diseases, infectious diseases and autoimmune 
conditions.
135
 In sum, depending upon the clinical picture presented, the 
differential diagnosis for symptoms previously associated exclusively with 
SBS now contemplates a wide range of nontraumatic possibilities: medical 
or surgical interventions; prenatal, perinatal and pregnancy-related 
conditions; birth effects; infections; diseases; disorders; malformations; 
post-vaccinal conditions; re-bleeds; and hypoxia (lack of oxygen to the 
brain).
136
 
Notwithstanding these rather seismic shifts in medical thinking, the 
criminal justice system has—with only rare and recent exception—been 
unyielding to new thinking about a diagnosis that proves a crime.  
IV. SBS AND THE LAW 
Given the scientific developments described, we may surmise that a 
sizeable portion of the universe of defendants convicted of SBS-based 
crimes is, in all likelihood, factually innocent. Even more certainly, a far 
greater number of defendants among this group were wrongfully 
convicted. The distinction is an important one:  
The expression ―wrongful conviction‖ is not a legal term of art and it 
has no settled meaning. Plainly the expression includes the conviction 
of those who are innocent of the crime of which they have been 
convicted. But in ordinary parlance the expression would, I think, be 
 
 
 133. The use of ―abusive‖ in this context is meant to convey a mental state beyond negligence, 
which accords with the vast majority of SBS-based criminal prosecutions. See infra note 248 
(elaborating on requisite mens rea).  
 134. See supra note 108 (defining ―differential diagnosis‖). 
 135. Andrew P. Sirotnak, Medical Disorders that Mimic Abusive Head Trauma, in ABUSIVE 
HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 191 
(Lori Frasier et al. eds., 2006). See also Barnes, supra note 79. 
 136. See generally K. Hymel et al., Intracranial Hemorrhage and Rebleeding in Suspected 
Victims of Abusive Head Trauma: Addressing the Forensic Controversies, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 
329 (2002); Barnes, supra note 87; see also supra notes 104–05. 
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extended to those who, whether guilty or not, should clearly not have 
been convicted at their trials . . . . In cases of this kind,[
137
] it may, or 
more often may not, be possible to say that a defendant is innocent, 
but it is possible to say that he has been wrongly convicted. The 
common factor in such cases is that something has gone seriously 
wrong in the investigation of the offence or the conduct of the trial, 
resulting in the conviction of someone who should not have been 
convicted.
138
 
In SBS cases, identifying the factually innocent is complicated by two 
related propositions. First, no crime whatsoever may have occurred, thus 
eliminating the opportunity to establish someone else‘s culpability.139 
Second, at least to date, science has not definitively established an 
alternative explanation for the injuries associated with SBS.
140
 What this 
means is that a significant number of people convicted in triad-only 
prosecutions
141
 are likely innocent of wrongdoing, but others are not, and 
we have no way of differentiating between these groups.
142
 Accordingly, 
we may rightly be troubled by the convictions of those whose factual 
innocence is unproven.  
The criminal justice implications of all of this are staggering.
143
 To put 
the scope of the problem in a more familiar framework, it is helpful to 
 
 
 137. Cases in which ―flawed expert evidence was relied on to secure conviction‖ are specifically 
referenced. Infra note 138.  
 138. This passage is taken from a speech of Lord Bingham, the senior law lord in the United 
Kingdom until his retirement, in R (on the application of Mullen) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2005] 1 AC 1, 4, cited in Stephanie Roberts & Lynne Weathered, Assisting the Factually 
Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 50 (2009).  
 139. ―Proving that someone else committed the crime is by far the most common method of 
achieving an exoneration, but it is unavailable if there was no crime at all.‖ Samuel R. Gross, 
Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 183 (2008).  
 140. See infra notes 233–45 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges associated with the 
differential diagnosis).  
 141. See supra note 58 (defining term). For the moment, I put aside cases in which a suspect‘s 
seemingly incriminatory account was used—in retrospect, incorrectly—to corroborate the prosecutor‘s 
case. See infra notes 183–90 and accompanying text.  
 142. My thanks to Robert Mosteller for helping me to arrive at this formulation. E-mail from 
Robert Mosteller, Harry R. Chadwick Sr. Professor of Law, Duke University, to Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Professor, University of Maine School of Law (Aug. 29, 2008, 15:46 EST) (on file with 
author).  
 143. In the estimation of one forensic medical expert, SBS cases may be divided into four groups. 
One includes those where injury is clearly inflicted, in all likelihood, by impact. Although, in this 
group, the causal mechanism may not be shaking, medical evidence apart from the triad indicates to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the baby was abused. In these cases, a finding of guilt 
seems just. The three remaining groups of cases involve evidence that, from a criminal justice stance, 
tends to negate proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant‘s guilt: evidence of natural disease, the 
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consider the number of known exonerations in the United States over the 
past thirty years. From 1989 through 2007, there were 210 DNA 
exonerations, mostly for rape.
144
 It is reasonable to suspect that this 
number of SBS-based convictions after trial occurred in the past year 
alone.
145
 Additional (non-DNA) exonerations include those of 111 inmates 
on death row, 135 other individuals, and perhaps another 200 or so 
defendants whose convictions were overturned based on a ―mass‖ scandal 
implicating widespread systemic corruption.
146
 Unlike SBS cases, none of 
these exonerations involve a set of paradigmatic facts later determined to 
be a faulty basis for prosecution.
147
  
Despite the large numbers of potentially impacted cases—or perhaps, 
because of them—our criminal justice system has yet to respond to new 
scientific realities.
148
 Its failure to do so stands in marked contrast to other 
nations‘ recognition of the problematic nature of pure-triad prosecutions. 
The emphatic institutional responses of the United Kingdom
149
 and 
                                                                                                                         
 
presence of chronic hematomas, and those in which no likely mechanism presents itself. Telephone 
Interview with John Plunkett, supra note 41.  
 144. Gross, supra note 139, at 175. Of course, DNA has uncovered only a fraction of the cases in 
which an innocent person was convicted. For a comprehensive examination of what is known—and all 
that we have yet to learn—about false convictions over the past thirty years, see Gross, supra note 139.  
 145. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that every 
one of these post-trial convictions would, upon review, be found wrongful. See supra notes 58, 143 
(refining subset of problematic cases). That said, a fair accounting of the number of defendants whose 
convictions have been undermined by scientific developments must also contemplate the possibility 
that some defendants who pleaded guilty before trial were innocent. See supra note 57; Gross, supra 
note 139, at 180–81 (generally discussing the difficulty of assessing how many innocent defendants 
plead guilty). Moreover, any inquiry aimed at quantitative measure should also acknowledge that triad-
only prosecutions continue to this day; therefore, a true reckoning of the magnitude of injustice 
implicates a somewhat prospective outlook.  
 146. Gross, supra note 139, at 175–76. 
 147. As Sam Gross suggested to me, arson cases may provide the closest analogy, albeit an 
imperfect one, to the problem that I am describing. Telephone Interview with Samuel Gross, supra 
note 50. In 1992, the National Fire Protection Association ―issued new guidelines that for the first time 
applied scientific principles to the analysis of the remains of suspicious fires, and revealed that the 
expert evidence of arson in [one death row inmate‘s] case, and many others, had no scientific basis.‖ 
Gross, supra note 139, at 183.  
 148. As a general proposition, the U.S. criminal justice system—in contrast to those of many other 
nations—does not respond to extra-legal developments in a monolithic manner. Our system is 
atomized by its federalist, multi-state nature and by the multiplicity of actors involved in decision 
making throughout the criminal process. To explicate how scientific developments around SBS have 
penetrated the justice system, is, therefore, a formidable challenge. This difficulty is compounded by 
the extent to which SBS prosecutions, as a phenomenon of increasing importance, have gone largely 
unnoticed and data related to them correspondingly uncollected. Despite this, a procedural analysis of 
the various stages at which legal standards guide the exercise of discretion follows. It provides a 
holistic perspective on a system that has not widely absorbed new scientific realities.  
 149. In 2005–2006, the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, conducted a seven-month review of 
eighty-eight SBS cases, including guilty verdicts and pleas. (SBS convictions are significantly less 
commonplace in the United Kingdom than in the States.) Lord Goldsmith‘s investigation was triggered 
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Canada
150
 are particularly instructive. Just as our criminal justice system 
has seemed to operate within a time bubble, largely untouched by 
scientific evolution, so, too, it remains insulated from unmistakable signs 
                                                                                                                         
 
by a 2005 Court of Appeal decision, now the governing case law, which concluded that ―[i]n cases 
where the triad alone is present . . . the triad alone ‗cannot automatically or necessarily‘ lead to a 
conclusion that the infant has been shaken.‖ THE RT HON THE LORD GOLDSMITH QC, THE REVIEW OF 
INFANT DEATH CASES: ADDENDUM TO REPORT SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME at 9–10 (2006). The 
Attorney General‘s review methodology is vulnerable to criticism, particularly because among the 
evidence considered ―to support the finding of SBS‖ was a defendant‘s ―[a]dmissions to shaking‖ and 
the presence of chronic subdural hematomas, id. at 12, each of which may be of limited corroborative 
value, see infra notes 104, 183–90 and accompanying text. This may explain why only three of the 
cases reviewed—a not insubstantial false conviction rate of 3.4%, but fewer than what many had 
expected—were identified as ―giving rise to concern‖ and referred to the Criminal Court of Appeal. 
Goldsmith, supra, at 14. Irrespective of methodological shortcomings, however, Lord Goldsmith‘s 
systemic review and the Court of Appeal decision that preceded it have appreciably altered the course 
of SBS prosecutions. As one commentator has suggested, ―in [the] future there will be demands for 
each case to be assessed individually, on the evidence available, rather than on a formula which has 
now been proved to have weaknesses.‖ Sam Lister, Q&A: Shaken Baby Syndrome, TIMES ONLINE, 
Feb. 14, 2006, www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article546383.ece.  
 150. On April 25, 2007, the Province of Ontario established an inquiry into pediatric forensic 
pathology and appointed Justice Stephen Goudge of the Court of Appeal its Commissioner. Seventeen 
months and $8.3 million later, Justice Goudge issued a 1000 page report which told what he called a 
―tragic story of pediatric forensic pathology in Ontario from 1981 to 2001. . . .‖ COMMISSIONER‘S 
STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF THE REPORT, Oct. 1, 2008. Many of the Commission‘s findings related 
specifically to the mistakes of one particular forensic pathologist and a failed oversight mechanism. 
But apart from the work of any individual, the report expressed deep concerns about the legitimacy of 
triad-based SBS prosecutions, concluding that in this set of cases, ―a further review is warranted as 
part of restoring public confidence.‖ Id. See Goudge, supra note 59, at 531 (―[O]ur systemic 
examination has identified this particular area of forensic pathology as one where change has raised 
the real possibility of past error.‖). In light of his doubts regarding ―convictions based on the pure 
‗triad,‘ where no other pathology evidence is identified, and possibly in other SBS cases,‖ id. at 528, 
Justice Goudge recommended that a review be conducted with the objective of ―identify[ing] those 
cases in which the pathology opinion can be said to be unreasonable in light of the understandings of 
today and in which the pathologists‘ opinions were sufficiently important to the case to raise 
significant concerns that the convictions were potentially wrongful,‖ id. at 531. Because many of the 
convicted parties are now claiming that their pleas were ―induced by various factors, including the 
serious consequences of potentially being convicted of murder charges and the acknowledged 
difficulties in challenging [the state‘s forensic pathologist‘s] opinions,‖ the report emphasized that 
―cases should not be excluded from review only because an accused pleaded guilty.‖ Id. at 532–33. 
Justice Goudge‘s findings and conclusions are detailed extensively in his full report, supra note 59.  
 Upon issuance of the Goudge Commission Report, the Ontario coroner‘s office quickly identified 
220 cases where a determination was made that an infant died after being shaken. Antonella Artuso, 
Shaken Baby Doubts Surface, OTTAWA SUN, Oct. 2, 2008, at 7. Under the auspices of the Attorney 
General, 142 of these cases are being reviewed by a team which includes the province‘s former 
associate chief justice, its chief forensic pathologist, a regional supervising coroner, a senior defense 
counsel, and a senior Crown attorney. Theresa Boyle, Team Selected to Probe 142 Shaken Baby Cases, 
THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 2, 2008, available at thestar.com. On November 6, 2008, Anna Sokoynyuk 
was the first person to have a case dismissed based on the Attorney General‘s review. She had been 
charged with murder for the death of her three-month-old daughter. Mom of Dead Baby Walks Free 
After Charges Against Her Withdrawn in Court, TORONTO CITY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www. 
citynews.ca/news/news_28894.aspx. 
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that, elsewhere in the world,
151
 other legal systems are assimilating new 
scientific understandings and adapting accordingly. When viewed in a 
global perspective, our continued adherence to a prosecution template that 
rests on discredited science is particularly jarring. 
What follows is an account of how we have arrived at this place.  
A. Investigation and Prosecution 
In the United States, unlike the United Kingdom and Canada, the SBS 
prosecution paradigm that ascended in the 1990s has remained largely 
untouched by scientific developments of the past decade.
152
 This systemic 
failure should not be equated with the prosecutorial pursuit of charges 
against defendants believed to be innocent of wrongdoing.
153
 Rather, SBS 
cases are going forward because law enforcement officers genuinely 
believe in the validity of the diagnostic triad that has fallen from scientific 
grace.
154
 But this explanation, while more benign than its alternative, begs 
the question of why the triad continues to exert an almost talismanic 
effect.
155
  
 
 
 151. Apart from the institutional review mechanisms instituted by the United Kingdom and 
Canada, it is worth noting that Australia‘s criminal justice system has also begun to absorb new 
scientific understandings. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Western Australia issued an important 
decision in an SBS case. R. v. Court (2003) 308 WASCA 1. At a bench trial for murder, the defendant 
was acquitted by a judge of all charges in a prosecution based on the presence of retinal hemorrhages 
and subdural hematoma, as well as spinal injury. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. Central to the verdict was the court‘s 
reliance on the testimony of a prominent forensic pathologist, who testified that it was ―not tenable‖ 
that the only possible cause of death was violent shaking. Id. ¶ 5. According to the trial judge,  
[a]s I understand [the defense expert‘s] evidence, he was suggesting that unless a witness had seen 
the deceased being shaken or unless there was some medical evidence consistent with the child 
having been shaken, such as bruising or other external injury, or acceptable admissions, then to 
conclude that the deceased had died by being shaken in a prolonged or violent way was, as he 
expressed it, ―highly suspect.‖ 
Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the reasonableness of this verdict. Id. ¶¶ 76, 95. 
 152. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text (discussing quantitative measures). Qualitative 
data also supports this proposition. Telephone Interview with Toni Blake, Jury Consultant, 2nd Chair 
Servs. (June 17, 2008); Telephone Interview with Brian Holmgren, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Davidson 
County Dist. Attorney Gen.‘s Office, Child Abuse Unit (July 1, 2008). 
 153. While it is easy, and even fashionable, to vilify prosecutors, they are typically motivated by a 
desire to hold the guilty responsible for their actions. Many child abuse prosecutors seem almost 
missionary about their task, but this may come with the territory. 
 154. According to the database maintained by Toni Blake, see supra note 24, the vast majority of 
prosecutions go forward based solely on the presence of one or more triad symptoms. Telephone 
Interview with Toni Blake, supra note 152. 
 155. Apart from the dynamics discussed in the remainder of this Part, it must be noted that the 
death of an infant—the embodiment of innocence—inevitably provokes an intense emotional response 
among participants in the criminal process. It is quite reasonable that those affected would experience 
what Susan Bandes has insightfully described as an ―urge to find an event blameworthy [in order] to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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It is worth noting the considerable deference given to child-abuse 
doctors
156—who, as a general rule, remain believers in the diagnosis.157 
Accordingly, prosecutors may exhibit a disinclination to interrogate the 
science upon which these physicians‘ opinions rest. There is nothing novel 
about the observation that prosecutors tend to defer to their experts; but, in 
this context, the relationship between the prosecutor and the allied medical 
professionals is a particularly close one.
158
 In the typical SBS case, the 
expert is the case: there is no victim who can provide an account, no 
eyewitness, no corroborative physical evidence, and no apparent motive to 
kill.
159
 Doctors identify both the occurrence of a crime and its perpetrator, 
and their assurance regarding each is essential for a conviction.
160
 These 
dynamics may well contribute to a prosecutorial reluctance to challenge 
the validity of an SBS diagnosis. But they do not fully explain a continued 
willingness to pursue charges in cases built entirely on contested expert 
testimony.
161
  
                                                                                                                         
 
convert a loss into a crime.‖ Interview with Susan A. Bandes, Distinguished Research Professor of 
Law, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, in Chi., Il. (Oct. 16, 2008). 
 156. In 2006, ―the American Board of Pediatrics approved a petition for subspecialty certification 
in child abuse pediatrics.‖ Kent P. Hymel & Karen Seaver Hill, Child Advocacy: New Board Specialty 
Signals Positive Change in Child Abuse Pediatrics, CHILDREN‘S HOSPITALS TODAY (2007), available 
at  http://www.childrenshospitals.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Archives&TEMPLATE=/CM/Content 
Display.cfm&CONTENTID=31157 (last visited May 6, 2009). The first board certification 
examination will take place in the fall of 2009. Id.  
 157. See Robert Parrish, Prosecuting a Case, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, 
AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 393, 396–97 (Lori Frasier et al. eds., 2006) (noting that American 
Prosecutors Research Institute and other prosecutors are a good source of referral to experts in area).  
 158. In many cases, this relationship has been formalized in a manner unique to the child-abuse 
setting. As described by one leading expert on nationwide prosecutorial practices: Many local 
prosecutors across the country have formed or participate in interdisciplinary teams intended to bring 
together child protective service (CPS) workers, law enforcement investigators, medical professionals, 
mental health providers, educators, and others who play a role in ensuring that justice is appropriately 
sought for severely abused children. Id. at 395; see also Holmgren, supra note 25, at 276. 
 159. The hypothesis generally advanced by pediatricians and prosecutors is that shaking ―results 
from tension and frustration generated by a baby‘s crying or irritability . . . .‖ Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
supra note 18, at 206. See also Holmgren, supra note 25, at 289–90 (―Prosecutors will often not be 
able to point to a traditional ‗motive‘ (e.g., hatred, jealousy, vengeance, greed) to explain the 
caretaker‘s conduct. Rather, they must reorient jurors to think about motive in a unique context—one 
that does not reflect a purposeful mental state but instead a risk factor, stressor or catalyst that prompts 
the caretaker‘s reactive and abusive conduct . . . . The most common motive in SBS cases is anger or 
frustration resulting from the infant‘s crying.‖). 
 160. The dominance of the ―team approach to investigation,‖ erodes a sharp differentiation 
between the roles of prosecutor and physician. Parrish, supra note 157, at 395–96. I found this to be 
true when, as a prosecutor, I participated in a medical grand rounds regarding a case that was the 
subject of one of my investigations.  
 161. Cognitive biases on the part of jurors, infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text, may also 
affect prosecutors.  
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To complete the account, it is helpful to consider first, how prosecutors 
are trained in the science of SBS; second, how prosecutors perceive the 
accounts of those suspected of abuse; and, third, how prosecutors are 
influenced by the systemic nature of SBS convictions.  
1. Prosecutorial Training 
Training is especially critical in this area, where a complex and 
evolving body of science is outcome determinative.
162
 As one prominent 
instructor recently urged, ―investigators and prosecutors should obtain a 
basic education on medical issues common to all of these cases.‖163 Since 
most prosecutors encounter SBS cases infrequently, few become experts 
in the issues they raise.
164
 It is unsurprising, then, that a nationwide 
training apparatus has developed to disseminate information about the 
basic structure of an SBS prosecution. For instance, the American 
Prosecutors Research Institute of the National District Attorneys 
Association
165
 transmits newsletters,
166
 organizes conferences,
167
 and 
 
 
 162. Parrish, supra note 157, at 395–96.  
 163. Id. at 395. ―A fundamental understanding of the medical knowledge concerning AHT 
committed against children is absolutely essential to a prosecutor‘s success in refuting commonly 
offered defenses, clarifying and dispelling myths introduced by opposing expert witnesses, and 
providing juries with sufficient information to reach a just decision.‖ Id. at 396. 
 164. ―It is rare for a particular prosecuting attorney to handle multiple cases involving AHT 
[abusive head trauma] in child victims unless the prosecutor works in a specialized team assigned to 
handle physical abuse and child homicide.‖ Id. at 396. Even those prosecutors who do develop an 
expertise in this type of case ―must be ever mindful that science is an ongoing process and medical 
research can quickly become dated . . . . Without a full understanding of the medical research that 
underlies an expert‘s opinion, the prosecutor can neither make full use of the physician‘s expertise, nor 
adequately cross-examine the opposing expert.‖ Holmgren, supra note 25, at 305.  
 165.  
The mission of the American Prosecutors Research Institute is to provide state and local 
prosecutors knowledge, skills and support to ensure that justice is done and the public safety rights 
of all persons are safeguarded. To accomplish this mission, APRI serves as a nationwide, 
interdisciplinary resource center for research and development, technical assistance, training and 
publications reflecting the highest standards and cutting-edge practices of the prosecutorial 
profession. 
American Prosecutors Research Institute, http://www.ndaa.org/apri/index.html (last visited July 21, 
2009). 
 166. See, e.g., Erin O‘Keefe, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Overcoming Untrue Defenses, 10 UPDATE 
11 (1997), available at http://www.ndaa.org/publications/newsletters/update_index.html; Devon Lee et 
al., Tips for Investigating Child Fatalities, 13 UPDATE 1 (2000), available at http://www.ndaa.org/ 
publications/newsletters/update_index.html; Victor I. Vieth, Tips for Medical Professionals Called as 
Witnesses, 13 UPDATE 7 (2000), available at http://ndaa.org/publications/ newsletters/update_index. 
html.  
 167. Most recently, in July 2008, the National District Attorneys Association convened a 
conference on the ―Investigation and Prosecution of Child Fatalities and Physical Abuse,‖ which 
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provides other support for prosecuting the SBS case.
168
 The National 
Center on Shaken Baby Syndrome, an organization dedicated in part to 
training law enforcement officers,
169
 has hosted and collaborated on nine 
conferences since 2000.
170
 And prosecutors who have become leaders in 
the field have published book chapters with instruction in handling SBS 
cases from investigation through trial.
171
  
These training materials present a view of the science refracted through 
an advocate‘s lens. For instance, a 2001 publication asserts: ―the 
[prosecution] expert can testify that the forces the child experiences are the 
equivalent of a 50–60 m.p.h. unrestrained motor vehicle accident, or a fall 
from 3–4 stories on a hard surface;‖172 and ―current research and 
professional consensus within the medical literature clearly supports the 
conclusion that . . . there is no lucid interval.‖173 Similarly, from a chapter 
published in 2006: ―there is emerging consensus among credible medical 
experts that when children have suffered serious or potentially fatal head 
injuries, they will start to experience symptoms almost immediately after 
injury;‖174 ―[t]he collection of ocular damage, subdural or subarachnoid 
bleeding over the brain, axonal damage, and severe brain swelling is not 
seen in the same patterns in any forms of accidental trauma, but is seen in 
cases involving severe and violent shaking;‖175 and ―the medical field has 
reached substantial consensus concerning many of the issues pertinent to 
criminal [SBS] cases.‖176  
While it should be expected that materials used to educate prosecutors 
would be strategically focused with respect to trial, this same orientation 
with respect to case investigation is more problematic. And while we 
might also anticipate that the most extreme critiques of the science 
underlying SBS convictions would be soundly—and passionately—
attacked, many of these materials fail to acknowledge the shifting of the 
                                                                                                                         
 
included discussion of Abusive Head Trauma. More information may be found at http://www.ndaa. 
org/education/apri/investigation_child_fatalities_abuse_2008.html (last visited July 21, 2009). 
 168. See Parrish, supra note 157, at 396.  
 169. National Center on Shaken Baby Syndrome, About the Center, http://www.dontshake.org/ 
sbs.php?topNavID=2&subNavID=10 (last visited July 21, 2009). 
 170. National Center on Shaken Baby Syndrome, Conferences, http://www.dontshake.org/ 
sbs.php?topNavID=5&subNavID=38 (last visited May 6, 2009).  
 171. See generally Holmgren, supra note 25; Parrish, supra note 157. 
 172. Holmgren, supra note 25, at 307. 
 173. Id. at 305. See id. at 307 (stating that ―the onset of symptoms is virtually contemporaneous 
with the abusive act‖). 
 174. Parrish, supra note 157, at 398. 
 175. Id. at 405. 
 176. Id. at 395. 
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center. In defending the science of old,
177
 the authors tend to obscure the 
changed consensus around fundamental aspects of the SBS diagnosis.
178
 
At the same time, significant challenges to the conventional medical 
wisdom are ignored.
179
 Nomenclature aside,
180
 few concessions to 
developments in research have been made. The digested science describes 
a diagnosis upon which prosecutors can securely rely.  
2. Caregiver Accounts 
Prosecutorial confidence in guilt is augmented by statements on the 
part of SBS suspects—statements which are inevitably perceived as 
incriminatory. The three accounts most often offered to explain an infant‘s 
loss of consciousness or other obviously severe neurological symptoms are 
that: (i) their onset was unprovoked/without explanation, (ii) the infant fell 
from a short distance, and (iii) the infant was shaken playfully or in the 
course of revival efforts.
181
 Research over the past decade has made each 
of these explanations newly plausible.
182
 But because law enforcement 
officers interrogating the SBS suspect ―know‖ that the infant‘s injuries 
were caused by violent shaking—the science is believed to prove this 
definitively—the narratives are all perceived as false and, therefore, 
incriminating.
183
  
Moreover, if the suspect‘s story changes in response to familiar 
interrogation techniques,
184
 this fact itself is used to support an SBS 
 
 
 177. See supra notes 172–76. Support for the assertions made in recent publications is often found 
in sources from the past that have since been challenged. For instance, a 2001 publication asserts that 
―the expert can testify that the forces the child experiences are the equivalent of a 50–60 m.p.h. 
unrestrained motor vehicle accident, or a fall from 3–4 stories on a hard surface‖ and cites evidence 
from the records of cases ranging from 1986–1994. Holmgren, supra note 25, at 307. In the same 
publication, the claim that ―the onset of symptoms is virtually contemporaneous with the abusive act‖ 
is bolstered by studies from the 1990s. Id. See also supra note 173. 
 178. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.  
 180. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (discussing new diagnostic labels). Most 
notable, pathognomony as the defining feature of SBS has been supplanted by the more ambiguous 
claim that ―retinal hemorrhages, bilateral subdural hematoma, and diffuse axonal injury are highly 
specific for SBS as a mechanism.‖ Holmgren, supra note 25, at 306. 
 181. Boos, supra note 14, at 50. 
 182. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 183. Holmgren, supra note 25, at 276 (―[T]he initial history provided by the caretaker is false in 
the vast majority of abuse cases and frequently evolves or changes over time as the caretaker is 
confronted with medical findings.‖) (citations to scientific literature omitted).  
 184. See Leestma, supra note 80, at 14 (noting that the ―interrogator may communicate to the 
accused that ‗if you could tell us exactly what happened and if you shook the baby, we could do 
something for the baby and maybe save its life.‘‖). While the particular tactics employed in the SBS 
context may be unique, the underlying techniques are not. See Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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diagnosis.
185
 The ensuing interrogation confirms the suspect‘s guilt, as this 
veteran SBS prosecutor‘s characterization suggests: Each of the three most 
common histories, and others, may be combined in patterns of changing 
histories as guilty adults attempt to fabricate new explanations to respond 
to the probing or suggestive questions of one or multiple interviews.
186
 
But even if the caregiver‘s story remains constant, it too may be used 
as evidence of guilt.
187
 The ―discrepant history‖—―when the history does 
not match the physical condition in front of you‖—is also seen as proof 
that the infant was shaken.
188
 Whatever contradicts the scientific ―givens‖ 
is deemed ―discrepant‖ and a confession.  
In sum, law enforcement officers confirm their suspicions of SBS 
whenever a suspect provides ―a false, discrepant, evolving or absent 
history.‖189 The suspect cannot avoid self-incrimination; the investigator‘s 
certainty of guilt can only be reinforced.
190
  
                                                                                                                         
 
Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 479, 512–20 (2006) (surveying empirical evidence on false confessions).  
 185. See, e.g., Carole Jenny et al., Analysis of Missed Cases of Abusive Head Trauma, 282 JAMA 
621 (1999); Robert Reece, Medical Evidence in the Context of Child Abuse Litigation, NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 607, 610 (2002) (―[T]he history does not match the physical condition in front of you . . . . Does 
the history fit what you see? If it does not, then you must question how such an injury could have 
occurred.‖). See also Anderson, supra note 55 (citing a nationally prominent pediatrician‘s 
observation, based on his consulting experience, that ―‗[i]f a parent does not know exactly what‘s 
happening, very frequently the first conclusion is that they‘re trying to hide something. And sometimes 
parents are racking their brains, coming up with one or two possibilities. Then it looks like they‘re 
changing their stories. That can be used to damn them.‘‖).  
 186. See Boos, supra note 14, at 50 (―[W]hose story has evolved or changed to fit new 
information revealed by medical reports, medical personnel, or investigators?‖); Parrish, supra note 
157, at 416.  
 187. A model prosecutorial summation makes this point as follows: ―it just couldn‘t happen the 
way the defendant says—not unless the laws of physics and gravity are different in the defendant‘s 
house. These doctors tell us that the defendant is a liar . . . . A defendant who lies to protect himself 
points the finger of guilt upon himself.‖ Holmgren, supra note 25, at 325.  
 188. Reece, supra note 61, at 610. Put differently, ―[t]he false histories help identify the likely 
individual who caused the child‘s injuries by providing compelling evidence of the abuser‘s 
consciousness of guilt.‖ Holmgren, supra note 25, at 277. 
 189. Holmgren, supra note 25, at 277. 
 190. Consider the dynamics reflected in the following interrogation of a day care provider 
suspected (based on the presence of the triad) of shaking a six-month-old infant to death. According to 
the caregiver‘s initial account, after leaving the children unattended for a short time, she returned to 
find a toddler sitting on the neck of the baby, who was having trouble breathing. After waiving her 
Miranda warnings, the caregiver (Rogers) was told by the interrogating officer (Wheeler) that: 
according to a ―panel of doctors,‖ a child ―could not have caused‖ the baby‘s injuries; that ―anyone 
could have been pushed ‗over the top‘ by all of the children in Rogers‘s care,‖ and ―if Rogers was just 
overwhelmed, then that was ‗explainable‘‖; that Wheeler ―already knew something ‗aggressive‘ 
happened, but now she just needed to know why;‖ that ―only an adult could have inflicted the force 
necessary to hurt [the baby] in this manner and that the injury occurred close to the time that [the baby] 
began seizing,‖ when only Rogers was present; that ―if [police] could not go to the doctors with a 
logical explanation for what happened, then it looked ‗very, very bad‘ for Rogers; and that Rogers‘s 
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3. Reification 
Finally, prosecutorial thinking about these cases is pervaded by an echo 
of the methodological fallacy of the early SBS literature.
191
 If, across the 
country over the years, defendants have been proven guilty of shaking 
babies to death based on the presence of retinal hemorrhages, subdural 
hematomas and cerebral edemas, then the presence of these symptoms 
must mean that someone is guilty of shaking a baby to death. All that 
remains is to identify the last person with the conscious child. That person 
becomes the suspect, who can then be confidently pursued. In this manner, 
the triad-based crime constructed by the medical establishment
192
 has been 
reified—its existence affirmed—by the systematic conviction of its 
apparent perpetrators.
193
 
B. Evidentiary Challenges 
Defense motions to exclude expert testimony regarding SBS have, 
almost without exception, proven unsuccessful.
194
 Despite new challenges 
to the scientific underpinnings of the diagnosis, the admission of SBS 
testimony is facilitated by its once-uncontroversial nature. Even recently, 
and in cases involving triad symptoms alone, courts in both Daubert and 
                                                                                                                         
 
story ―had to match the medical evidence.‖ Two hours after the interview began, Rogers confessed to 
shaking the baby and (―she thought‖) repeatedly slamming his head on the floor. She was arrested, 
charged and convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  
 In an extraordinary decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the defendant‘s conviction 
due to a violation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Specifically, the court held 
that Rogers had invoked her right to silence, and that this invocation was not scrupulously honored by 
the police. The case will be tried later this year. Telephone Interview with Tim Burns, Douglas County 
Pub. Defender‘s Office (June 10, 2009). 
 191. The cognitive dissonance resulting from having prosecuted people whose guilt has now been 
scientifically undermined should not be discounted. But here I am identifying a dynamic that is more 
systemic.  
 192. See supra Part III.A.  
 193. This dynamic has likely been perpetuated by media coverage of always sensational ―baby-
killing‖ cases. See supra note 40. See also Vanessa Bauza, Abusive Shaking Top Killer of Babies; 
Police Say Infant Latest Area Victim, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 4, 1999. 
 194. In the course of my research, I have not been made aware of any case in which the testimony 
of defense experts challenging the basis for an SBS diagnosis was excluded on Daubert or Frye 
grounds. See infra note 195 for a summary of the Daubert and Frye standards. Prosecutors are either 
declining to make these challenges or are making them unsuccessfully. See Holmgren, supra note 25, 
at 316 (―There is no scientific research which supports the re-bleed theory of causation in very young 
children. . . . Accordingly, the application of this theory to infants should be challenged on Frye and 
Daubert grounds.‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2009] NEXT INNOCENCE PROJECT 33 
 
 
 
 
Frye jurisdictions
195
 have rejected arguments that SBS is not generally 
accepted in the medical community
196
 and that it is not based on reliable 
scientific methods.
197
 
Given the importance placed on the criterion of general acceptance 
within the ―relevant‖ scientific community—even in Daubert 
jurisdictions, where it is not dispositive—the consensus among 
pediatricians has been given particular emphasis by admitting trial 
judges.
198
 In the absence of legally binding precedent, judges are well 
aware that ―for some time, courts in other states have found shaken baby 
syndrome to be a generally accepted diagnosis in the medical 
community.‖199 Judges have also noted that research into SBS has been 
peer reviewed, and that there has been ―considerable literature put out by 
professional scientific organizations that substantiate the findings.‖200 
While at least one court has explicitly recognized ―[t]he absence of a 
 
 
 195.  
Two approaches [to the admissibility of scientific testimony] are dominant—general acceptance 
[Frye] and scientific soundness [Daubert]. Under the former, the proponent must show that the 
scientific community agrees that the principles or techniques on which the expert relies are 
capable of producing accurate information and conclusions. Under the latter standard, general 
acceptance remains an important consideration, but the court must consider other factors to decide 
for itself whether the expert‘s methodology is scientifically valid. 
CHARLES MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 335 (Kenneth S. Brown et al. eds., 6th ed. 
2006). 
 196. See, e.g., Middleton v. State, 980 So. 2d 351, 353 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (defendant 
contended that ―Shaken Baby Syndrome is not a condition or theory that is generally accepted in the 
medical community‖). 
 197. See, e.g., State v. Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Neb. 2003) (defendant argued ―that the 
theory of shaken baby syndrome as a cause of certain injuries was not supported by reliable scientific 
authority, data, or research‖).  
 198. See, e.g., id. at 627–28 (SBS ―is generally accepted within the scientific medical community 
of pediatrics‖) (internal quotations omitted). The Leibhart court concluded that  
[w]ith respect to general causation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding on 
this record that the reasoning or methodology underlying testimony regarding shaken baby 
syndrome was valid, and with respect to specific causation, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that such reasoning or methodology properly could be applied to the facts 
in issue in this case. 
Id. at 628. 
 199. Id. at 628 (citing State v. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390 (S.C. 1991); State v. McClary, 541 A.2d 96 
(Conn. 1988); In re Lou R., 499 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986)). See also State v. Vandemark, 
No. 04-01-0225, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 376, at *8–9 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004) (―[I]t seems that the 
science behind Shaken Baby Impact Syndrome has been accepted in Delaware and just about every 
other jurisdiction.‖). See Holmgren, supra note 25, at 306 (―Expert testimony involving a diagnosis of 
SBS is well recognized and does not need to satisfy the Daubert or Frye Standards governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony or novel scientific evidence.‖).  
 200. Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d. at 627 (internal quotation omitted).  
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known rate of error,‖ this void was dismissed as merely ―reflect[ing] the 
limitations of the subject matter.‖201  
The standards for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence 
in effect privilege the institutionalized theoretical framework—even 
despite serious doubts about the validity of underlying methodologies. 
Perhaps judicial reluctance to keep testimony regarding SBS from the jury 
derives from faulty evaluations of the science, or from an overly 
deferential respect for the establishment that recommends it. But it is also 
quite likely that judges are allowing this type of testimony because our 
justice system is structured in a way that makes its admission the default. 
―[T]he standard for admissibility is relevance and reliability, not 
certainty,‖ as courts often remark when allowing SBS testimony.202 
As is widely recognized, the law of evidence is fundamentally 
premised on the functioning of our adversary system. As the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., ―[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.‖203 Courts 
often justify the admission of SBS testimony by reference to this 
foundational principle. For instance: ―The ‗gate-keeping function of the 
court was never meant to supplant the adversarial trial process. The fact 
that experts disagree as to methodologies and conclusions is not grounds 
for excluding relevant testimony;‘‖204 ―‗[a] party confronted with an 
adverse expert witness who has sufficient, though perhaps not 
overwhelming, facts and assumptions as the basis for his opinion can 
highlight those weaknesses through effective cross-examination.‘‖205 
Admissibility determinations are also grounded in the proper allocation 
of decision-making authority between judge and juror. In a recent reversal 
on interlocutory appeal of a trial judge‘s order excluding the prosecution‘s 
 
 
 201. Vandemark, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 376, at *16–17. Discussing a particular study where the 
rate of false positives (i.e., cases incorrectly diagnosed as abuse) was admittedly unknown, the trial 
judge noted that ―no suggestion was made about how to structure [a more rigorous] analysis.‖ Id. at 
*16. In Leibhart, the court made a similar observation regarding the limits of the science proffered by 
the prosecution: ―it [has] been clinically tested as the best it can.‖ Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d at 627.  
 202. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo. 2003).  
 203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). 
 204. Commonwealth v. Martin, Nos. 2006-CA-002236-MR, 2006-CA-002237-MR, 2008 WL 
2388382, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 2008) (quoting LP Matthews LLC v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., 
458 F. Supp. 2d 198, 210 (D. Del. 2006)). 
 205. Id. at *8 (quoting Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
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SBS testimony, this consideration was explicitly invoked:
206
 ―The 
gatekeeping function of the trial court is restricted to keeping out 
unreliable expert testimony, not to assessing the weight of the testimony. 
This latter role is assigned to the jury.‖207 Even more emphatically, ―[t]he 
court is only a gatekeeper, and a gatekeeper alone does not protect the 
castle . . . .‖208 
Systemic factors construct a presumption of admissibility: if the 
evidence is not ―pseudoscientific‖ or ―junk science,‖209 it comes in. This 
presumption is overcome only rarely by still-evolving research.
210
 In 
recent years, testimony regarding SBS has been excluded only twice.
211
 In 
Kentucky, after hearing from experts on both sides, a trial court concluded 
that the diagnosis ―presupposes the cause.‖212 The court‘s order continued: 
―To allow a physician to diagnose SBS with only the two classical 
markers, and no other evidence of manifest injuries, is to allow a physician 
to diagnose a legal conclusion.‖213 Accordingly, the judge precluded the 
state from presenting expert testimony regarding SBS based exclusively 
on subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhage and in the absence of ―any 
other indicia of abuse.‖214 As noted, this order was subsequently 
 
 
 206. According to the appellate court, the trial judge‘s order  
was an abuse of discretion, because it was founded on the unsupported legal conclusion that 
because there was dispute amongst the experts as to the possible cause of the infants‘ injuries, it 
was the court‘s role to choose the side it found more convincing and exclude the side it found less 
convincing, based in part on giving greater weight to ―scientific‖ as opposed to ―clinical‖ studies. 
Id. at *7. For further discussion of the evidentiary ruling in Martin, see infra notes 212–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 207. Martin, 2008 WL 2388382, at *7. 
 208. Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 245 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 209. Id. at *7 (noting that testimony of prosecution experts, ―even accepting . . . its flaws‖ cannot 
be so described).  
 210. State v. Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d 618, 628 (Neb. 2003) (reexamination under Daubert 
appropriate ―where recent developments raise doubts about the validity of previously relied-upon 
theories‖) (citation omitted). 
 211. This conclusion is based on searches of the LEXIS database and the web, as well as my 
conversations with the likely participants in these litigation efforts. Telephone Interview with John 
Plunkett, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Toni Blake, supra note 152; Telephone Interview 
with Brian Holmgren, supra note 152. In addition to the two admissibility decisions discussed above, a 
few trial courts have disallowed experts from using the SBS terminology. For instance, a judge in Ohio 
precluded reference to SBS, concluding that testimony to this effect would improperly usurp the role 
of the jury. The prosecution expert was, however, allowed to testify ―as to the characteristics of the 
injuries suffered by a child believed to have been subjected to rotational acceleration/deceleration.‖ 
Renee Brown, Judge Denies Reference to Syndrome During Trial, TIMES REPORTER (New Phila., 
Ohio) (on file with author). 
 212. Order and Opinion Re: Daubert Hearing, Kentucky v. Davis, Case No. 04-CR-205 at *21 
(Ky. Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2006). 
 213. Id. at *23. 
 214. Id. 
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reversed.
215
 The defendant has appealed the decision to the state supreme 
court.
216
  
The other court to exclude SBS evidence did so in a case also involving 
a diagnosis based on retinal hemorrhage and subdural hematoma.
217
 After 
hearing testimony from experts on both sides, the Missouri trial judge 
determined that the SBS diagnosis ―appears to have gained considerable 
acceptance . . . among pediatricians. However, there is substantial, 
persistent and continuing criticism of this diagnosis among many in the 
medical and scientific research communities.‖218 In its unpublished order, 
the court concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden of 
establishing that SBS is generally accepted in the scientific and medical 
communities.
219
 The state was thus precluded from offering testimony that 
the infant was a victim of violent shaking based on the diagnostic triad 
alone.
220
 This ruling was not appealed.
221
 
Although the two trial court decisions to exclude testimony about SBS 
are outliers, they foretell more aggressive defense challenges to the 
 
 
 215. Commonwealth v. Martin, Nos. 2006-CA-002236-MR, 2006-CA-002237-MR, 2008 WL 
2388382, at *9 (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 2008). 
 216. The appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court was filed on July 14, 2008 and is pending as the 
Article goes to print. The ―CaseInfo‖ sheet for Martin is available at http://apps.kycourts.net/coa_ 
public/CaseInfo.aspx?Case=2006CA002236.  
 217. Order, State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-CR00016-02 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2007). In Hyatt, the one-
year-old who was being cared for by the defendant was released from the hospital without lasting 
injury. The caregiver has been charged with abuse of a child for ―knowingly inflict[ing] cruel and 
inhuman punishment upon [the baby] by shaking her, and in the course thereof . . . caus[ing] serious 
emotional injury. . . .‖ The felony is punishable by five to fifteen years in prison. Felony Complaint, 
State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-CR00016-02 (on file with author).  
 218. Order, supra note 217. The court further noted: ―The critics contend that subdural hematoma 
and retinal bleeding can have many other causes and that the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome is 
merely a ‗default‘ diagnosis, one which pediatricians use when they have no other explanation for the 
cause of the child‘s injuries.‖ Id. 
 219. Id. Missouri is a Frye jurisdiction. Request for ‗Frye‘ Hearing and Brief in Support of 
Request, State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-CR00016-02 (Mo. Cir. Ct.) (on file with author).  
 220.  
The Court therefore finds that in the absence of some other evidence or indicia of abuse besides 
subdural hematoma, retinal bleeding and absence of cranial trauma, neither party may call a 
witness to give an expert opinion that the child was the victim of violent shaking; the Court further 
finds that an expert may not opine that a (small) subdural hematoma and retinal bleeding in an 
infant can only be caused by manual shaking. 
Order, supra note 217.  
 221. Nevertheless, the state attempted to proceed on the theory that previously occurring injuries 
(i.e., a small bruise and scrape) constituted ―other indicia of abuse.‖ Telephone Interview with Kirk 
Zwink, Esq., Sole Practitioner, Karl Zwink Law Office (July 21, 2008). According to Kirk Zwink, who 
represented Kathy Hyatt, the state‘s evidence at trial included claimed inconsistencies in the 
defendant‘s account, as well as the expert testimony of two pediatricians. Id. The defendant testified 
and presented an expert pathologist on her behalf. After a three-day trial in January 2009, the jury 
returned its verdict within a half hour: not guilty. Id.  
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admissibility of the science, as well as greater pressure on judges to 
restrict the scope of expert testimony. If research in this area continues to 
erode the foundations of the diagnosis, evidentiary rulings will evolve 
accordingly—but only after a lag guaranteed by judicial deference to 
precedent, to physicians, and to the workings of the adversary system. For 
now, with few exceptions, if an SBS case goes to trial, juries will decide 
the worth of the science and the fate of the accused.  
C. Jury Verdicts 
Little is known about the operation of juries in shaken baby cases.
222
 
One national trial consultant who assists the defense in this area has 
estimated a conviction rate of 95%;
223
 a prosecutor widely recognized as a 
national authority on SBS has suggested that the figure is closer to 50%;
224
 
and a forensic pathologist who has consulted on many hundreds of cases 
for the defense places the figure somewhere between the two.
225
 In the 
absence of meaningful empirical documentation,
226
 the impressionistic 
data of those who see the largest number of these cases—and have done so 
for at least a decade—becomes a helpful source of information.  
Such experts in SBS trial outcomes seem to agree upon certain basic 
propositions. Juries continue to convict based on medical testimony about 
the triad of symptoms.
227
 They are, however, acquitting more frequently 
today than ever before.
228
 Although the most important predictor of an 
 
 
 222. ―Typically, a jury verdict in a criminal case is inscrutable; the jury performs its paradigmatic 
function as fact finder shrouded in secrecy, and it is impossible to say why or how the jury convicted 
or acquitted in any given case.‖ Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 432 (2008). For 
reasons already discussed, the ―black box‖ nature of the jury may well be compounded in the SBS 
context. See supra note 148 (observing that ascendance of the prosecution paradigm has gone largely 
unnoticed and remarking on a corresponding failure to collect data). 
 223. Telephone Interview with Toni Blake, supra note 152. As a basis for comparison, for an 
analysis of overall conviction rates, see Andrew D. Leipold, Why are Federal Judges so Acquittal 
Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151 (2005). See also Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and 
Data about the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167 (2005).  
 224. Telephone Interview with Brian Holmgren, supra note 152. 
 225. Telephone Interview with John Plunkett, supra note 41 (estimating conviction rate of 1/2 to 
2/3 of cases tried). 
 226. The National Center on Shaken Baby Syndrome keeps no centralized database, and no other 
organization tracks prosecutions. The largest database containing this type of information belongs to 
Toni Blake, the leading trial consultant in this area. Blake‘s database contains over 500 SBS cases 
from 1997–2007. Telephone Interview with Toni Blake, supra note 152. 
 227. Where there is medical corroboration of abuse beyond the triad—e.g., rib fractures, grip 
marks, long bone fractures, and evidence of injuries in various stages of healing—the case is often 
resolved by a guilty plea before trial. See supra note 41.  
 228. Telephone Interview with Toni Blake, supra note 152; Telephone Interview with Brian 
Holmgren, supra note 152; Telephone Interview with John Plunkett, supra note 41. For an account of 
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acquittal is the defense presentation of nationally prominent experts who 
challenge the science,
229
 the presentation of this type of evidence still 
results in conviction more often than acquittal.
230
 Therefore, while an 
increasing reliance on defense experts
231
 and a growing population of such 
experts for defendants to draw on
232
 should be expected to result in a 
greater number of acquittals proportionally, there is every reason to 
believe that SBS-based convictions will persist.  
In prosecutions that rely on science to prove causation, mens rea and 
identity, how can jurors faced with genuine scientific debate as to each of 
these elements be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? To make 
sense of this question, consider how the prosecution‘s burden of proof 
may be effectively eased, first, by the skepticism that greets the 
―differential diagnosis‖ offered by the defense experts233 and, second, by 
the sheer inertial force of SBS.  
The current state of the science does not typically allow the defense to 
identify one cause with certainty. Instead, experts provide a complex 
forensic analysis. From the defendant‘s perspective, the differential 
diagnosis is strategically important because it provides an alternative 
version of events—albeit a less definitive one—that gives jurors a 
different way of thinking about what happened. But the differential 
diagnosis is also dangerous, as it tends to functionally shift the 
prosecutor‘s burden of proving its theory of the case onto the defense.234 
The state‘s winning argument to juries is this: the defendant has not 
established what caused the child’s death while the prosecution experts 
are in full agreement regarding their diagnosis. They told you what the 
three presenting symptoms mean—how they are caused, how much force is 
                                                                                                                         
 
one recent acquittal, see Wendy Davis, Danforth Woman Found Not Guilty of First Degree Murder, 
WATSEKA TIMES REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 2009. 
 229. Toni Blake has also suggested that mothers are convicted at the highest rates. Telephone 
Interview with Toni Blake, supra note 152.  
 230. Id.; Telephone Interview with Brian Holmgren, supra note 152; Telephone Interview with 
John Plunkett, supra note 41.  
 231. As noted by the expert who is widely credited (or, depending on perspective, maligned) for 
spearheading the movement of SBS skeptics, the more doctors a defendant can afford, the greater the 
likelihood of an acquittal. Telephone Interview with John Plunkett, supra note 41. While the equity 
concerns raised by SBS cases are not unique to this context, they may be particularly acute where, as 
here, the science dictates outcomes.  
 232. The minority view is becoming more prevalent. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day 
One), supra note 71, at 70; Testimony of George R. Nichols in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day 
One) at 170, State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2008) (No. 96 CF 555); Telephone 
Interview with John Plunkett, supra note 41; Interview with Thomas Bohan, supra note 78.  
 233. See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 234. A specifically crafted jury instruction could explain the interplay between defense evidence 
of a differential diagnosis and the prosecution‘s burden of proof.  
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required, and how soon after the trauma the baby would have lost 
consciousness. The defense experts gave you a list of various possibilities, 
but admitted that they could not be sure about what happened here. And, 
indeed, they did not even agree amongst themselves regarding this child’s 
death.
235
  
In the Edmunds post-conviction hearing, where the determination for a 
judge was whether new scientific research would probably result in a 
different outcome at trial,
236
 the prosecutor made this appeal: ―The primary 
flaw [in the defendant‘s theory of post-conviction relief] is the fact—and 
it‘s not an opinion; it is a fact—that no one on this defense team could 
agree on the cause of death in this case.‖237 Indeed, no defense expert 
testified to certainty regarding any particular theory of death.
238
  
This reasoning would seem to have considerable traction with jurors.
239
 
Indeed, the differential diagnosis—or, from the perspective of the 
prosecution, ―a veritable laundry list of alternative medical possibilities 
which are commonly proffered‖ by the defense240—has become a critical 
area of contention in SBS trials.
241
  
The defense must concede that it cannot definitively prove a 
mechanism of injury.
242
 According to the accused in an SBS case, 
testimony regarding other plausible diagnoses is important not because it 
definitively establishes the occurrence of a scenario other than the one 
 
 
 235. For sample prosecutorial closing argument in SBS case, see Holmgren, supra note 25, at 
324–27. See also Attorney for the State in Transcript of Oral Argument at 89–90, State v. Edmunds, 
746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2008) (No. 96 CF 555) (―It might be interesting, it might be fun for the 
defendant to have the jury speculate, but that‘s not what we do in courts of law.‖). 
 236. More precisely, the court must determine ―whether a reasonable probability exists that a 
different result would be reached at trial.‖ Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 13, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 13 
(citation omitted). See infra Part IV.E.1. 
 237. Attorney for the State in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 235, at 75–76. The 
prosecutor reiterated this point later in the argument: ―the mud balls; throw, throw, see if something 
sticks. Differential Diagnosis.‖ Id. at 87–88.  
 238. See, e.g., Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 71. 
 239. As one prosecutor has instructed, ―[d]efenses are frequently focused on other possible 
medical explanation for the injuries. A responsive theme might be that ‗arguments derived from 
possibilities are idle.‘‖ Holmgren, supra note 25, at 288. 
 240. Id. at 314. See id. at 319 (―The expert who acknowledges the classic findings of SBS include 
subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhage and edema, but chooses to ignore this constellation of findings 
in favor of an alternative hypothesis will appear foolish.‖); id. at 312–19 (discussion of ―meeting 
untrue defenses and cross-examination of defense experts‖).  
 241. See Parrish, supra note 157, at 410 (suggesting prosecutorial strategy for dealing with 
defense experts‘ testimony regarding differential diagnosis).  
 242. Edmunds acknowledged as much in her post-conviction relief hearing, but argued that this 
burden was not properly hers: ―The state says in terms of differential diagnosis, bring it home . . . . 
[p]rove your other causes. Well, this . . . puts the burden backwards. We don‘t have a burden of 
proving some alternative cause.‖ Attorney for the Defense in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
115, at 141. See id. at 138.  
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hypothesized by the prosecution, but because it casts doubt on the claim 
that no other scenario could explain the symptoms.  
This mode of argument tends to be deeply unsatisfying to the human 
psyche and, as a consequence, problematic for jury decision making. It is 
widely recognized that ―fact finders look for stories, not just discrete 
nuggets of fact to fit into a set of legal rules.‖243 Burdens of proof 
notwithstanding, a consensus that identifies a single narrative will almost 
invariably trump an amalgam of possibilities that challenge it.
244
 In SBS 
cases, what the defense asks the jury to do is surmount this psychological 
barrier
245
 and acquit.  
The likelihood of this occurring is diminished by the context in which 
the medical dispute is presented to jurors. In a typical SBS case, as a 
matter of law, the prosecution must establish that the presence of retinal 
hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and cerebral edema proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant on trial shook the baby to death. If the 
science cannot bear this burden, the jury must acquit—even in the absence 
of a known cause.
246
 The reality is quite different on the ground, where, to 
prevail at trial, a defendant must disprove the validity of a medical 
diagnosis with impressive establishment bona fides.  
Until only recently, SBS had been embraced nearly unanimously by the 
scientific community, and it still commands the faithful adherence of a 
majority of physicians. To the general public, the diagnosis has come to be 
understood as a meaningful marker of criminality. Substance aside, these 
measures of acceptance serve as powerful proxies for truth, enabling jurors 
to discount the insights of the skeptics and the challenges raised by their 
research.  
 
 
 243. Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 288 (1993).  
 244. I have previously observed that ―verdicts reflect which narrative was more persuasive to the 
jury.‖ Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 981 (2004).  
 245. This type of reasoning is ―speculative,‖ see supra note 235, insofar as it requires jurors to 
reach a verdict in the absence of a proven causal mechanism. But thus defined, where the 
prosecution‘s version of events has not been adequately established, a speculative verdict is 
completely appropriate, and indeed dictated by the presumption of innocence. Put differently, SBS 
defendants who challenge the science do not advance any particular explanation as the definitive cause 
of death, but, rather, insist that since a number of possibilities could have been causal, the prosecution 
cannot satisfy its burden of proof. The jury need not speculate that any one of the alternatives is in fact 
the cause; the very existence of alternatives negates proof of inflicted injury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
 246. As Edmunds‘s attorney argued in her post-conviction relief hearing, the ―evidence is now 
there that undermines the state‘s ability to prove the mechanism and timing of death.‖ Attorney for the 
Defense in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 115, at 138.  
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D. Insufficiency Claims 
Defendants challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against them in 
SBS cases
247
 focus on two areas of arguably deficient proof: mens rea,
248
 
and causation/identity.
249
 While many prosecutions involve physical 
evidence of other abuse (i.e., beyond shaking) apart from the triad,
250
 a 
substantial number rests solely on the presence of retinal hemorrhaging 
and subdural hematoma.
251
 Even in this latter subcategory, courts are 
invariably affirming convictions.
252
 
 
 
 247. Defendants may move for a judgment of acquittal based on an insufficiency of the evidence 
at the conclusion of the prosecution‘s case, after the defense has rested, and again after the jury has 
returned its verdict. A denial of this motion is given considerable deference, but is reviewable on direct 
appeal or on collateral attack. While the applicable legal standards differ, claims that a conviction rests 
on insufficient evidence raise similar issues across jurisdictional and procedural contexts.  
 248. See Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory Proposal, 89 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 535, 551–74 (1999) (discussing mental states associated with traditional homicide 
statutes used to prosecute defendants under SBS theory). For a sampling of cases from just this past 
year, see, e.g., Mitchell v. State, No. CACR 07-472, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 98 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 
2008); People v. Lemons, No. 273058, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 387 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008); 
State v. Gilbert, No. M2007-00260-CCA-R3-DC, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Apr. 8, 2008).  
 249. See, e.g., U.S. v. Dimberio, 56 M.J. 20 (C.A.A.F. 2001); State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260 (N.H. 
2000). See also infra notes 257–68.  
 250. See, e.g., People v. Frank, No. A109619, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3777 (Cal. Ct. App. 
May 10, 2007); People v. Heredia, No. A112828, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9537 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 28, 2007); Moore v. State, 656 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2008); State v. Hollins, 981 So. 2d 819 (La. Ct. 
App. 2008); State v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Batich, No. 2006-A-0031, 
2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2127 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 2007); Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); State v. Sweet, No. E2007-OD202-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 
280 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2008); Hammond v. State, No. 2-06-417-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 
969 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2008).  
 While this Article is largely concerned with triad-based SBS prosecutions, it bears mentioning that 
even cases involving proof apart from the triad may be problematic. Some physical evidence is of 
questionable corroborative value. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, No. 269957, 2007 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 2412 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2007) (bruise on right temple). Moreover, even where the 
physical evidence clearly indicates abuse, the identity of the perpetrator may be disputed. See, e.g., 
People v. Garcia, No. H023327, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3479 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2003). In 
Garcia, the defense expert testified to preexisting injuries unrelated to head trauma. Id. at *10. He 
―agreed that [the baby] was a battered child, that his injuries were nonaccidental, and that his death 
was a homicide. But he believed that it was impossible to determine with medical certainty whether 
the injuries that caused his death occurred shortly before the time of death or whether death resulted 
from complications from earlier patterns of injuries.‖ Id. Finally, reliance on perpetrator ―confessions‖ 
to prove guilt may be misplaced. See supra Part IV.A.2  
 251. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, No. D049865, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9866 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 6, 2007); Middleton v. State, 980 So. 2d 351 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
 252. In the past year, the only court to reverse an SBS conviction did so because the defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel. In Schoonmaker, the New Mexico Supreme Court noted 
that ―[e]xpert testimony was critical to the defense to call into question the State‘s expert opinions that 
[the child‘s] injuries could only have been caused by shaking of a violent nature.‖ State v. 
Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1113 (N.M. 2008). Based on the testimony of defense experts in other 
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Deference to the fact-finding functions of juries translates into a legal 
regime generally hostile to insufficiency arguments.
253
 In the evidentiary 
context, this judicial deference is exercised at the front-end of the trial 
process; here it comes at the back-end, after the prosecution has rested, 
after the defense has rested, and/or after the jury has returned its guilty 
verdict.
254
 The governing standard on appeal is ―whether, considering the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the offense charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt.‖255 It is thus to be expected that defendants rarely 
persuade courts to overturn SBS-based convictions on sufficiency 
grounds.
256
  
                                                                                                                         
 
cases and published scientific research, the court found that ―disagreement exists in the medical 
community as to the amount of time between when injuries occur and when the child becomes 
symptomatic, and whether injuries like [the child‘s] can be caused by short-distance falls. . . .‖ Id. at 
1114. It was clear, therefore, that the defendant‘s failure to call experts to testify on his behalf was due 
not to the absence of supporting science, but to poverty. Id. at 1113–16. In a remarkable opinion, the 
court concluded that because of the trial courts‘ role in ―deny[ing] counsel access to the necessary 
funding,‖ the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 1114.  
 In another appeal based on ineffective assistance, the Utah Supreme Court in 2007 reversed a 
murder conviction based on defense counsel‘s failure to retain a qualified expert to examine CT scans 
of the infant‘s injuries. State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007). In Hales, SBS was diagnosed based 
on brain swelling and retinal hemorrhages. Id. at 326. According to the State‘s expert, these injuries 
could only have been caused by violent shaking which would have caused immediate unconsciousness 
with no possibility of a lucid interval. Id. at 329. In support of his motion, the defendant submitted the 
affidavit of a pediatric neuroradiologist stating that, based upon his (post-conviction) review of the CT 
scan, it would have been impossible for trauma to have occurred during the time period in which the 
defendant was with the baby. Id. In response to the court‘s ruling, the state determined that there was 
insufficient evidence to proceed with further prosecution. Stephen Hunt, New Evidence Frees Inmate 
in Murder Case, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, June 16, 2007.  
 253. ―The basic problem seems to be that judges to not want to look as though they are abrogating 
the role of the jury as trier of fact. The legal sufficiency of evidence is, technically, a question of law, 
but it looks and sounds like a judgment on the weight of the evidence—it is a judgment on the weight 
of the evidence, only an extreme one.‖ Samuel R. Gross, Substance & Form in Scientific Evidence: 
What Daubert Didn’t Do, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 234, 252 (Larry Kramer ed., 
1996). 
 254. See supra note 247 (detailing procedural postures of various types of sufficiency challenges).  
 255. State v. Gilbert, No. M2007-00260-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2008) (citations omitted).  
 256. In the rare instance where an appellate court has reversed a SBS conviction, it has done so on 
other grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1993) (prejudicial in-court 
shaking demonstration with baby doll); People v. Basuta, 94 Cal. App. 4th 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) 
(evidentiary); Andrews v. State, 811 A.2d 282 (Md. 2002) (same); State v. Maze, No. M2004-02091-
CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1132083 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2006) (failure to instruct on lesser-
included charges); Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105 (ineffective assistance of counsel); Caban v. State, 
No. 5D08-279, 2009 WL 722049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2009) (improper impeachment of 
defense expert).  
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Shirley Ree Smith may be the only defendant to succeed in doing so.
257
 
Her case is extraordinary, particularly because the procedural context in 
which the claim arose—an appeal of a denial of Smith‘s federal habeas 
petition—makes the result exceedingly unlikely.  
In certain respects, the facts of Smith diverge from the paradigmatic 
SBS pattern. The defendant was the child‘s grandmother.258 The medical 
evidence showed an absence of retinal bleeding.
259
 Most significantly, 
pathologists found ―no swelling, and only a small, non-fatal amount‖ of 
subdural and subarachnoid bleeding.
260
 
But in other ways, the facts share important similarities with the typical 
triad-only SBS prosecution. No bruises on the body, fractures, or grip 
marks were present.
261
 The accused claimed to have discovered the infant 
in a nonresponsive state.
262
 The ―discrepant history‖ was considered 
evidence of guilt.
263
 The prosecution experts‘ testimony was ―absolutely 
critical to its case.‖264  
Even under the highly deferential standard mandated on federal habeas 
review,
265
 a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that this 
evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict: ―There was simply no 
 
 
 257. I reach this conclusion based on a thorough search of the LEXIS database and my 
conversations with leaders on both sides of nationwide litigation efforts. 
 258. As the court remarked,  
[t]his is not the typical shaken baby case. Grandmothers, especially those not serving as the 
primary caretakers, are not the typical perpetrators. Further, Petitioner was helping her daughter 
raise her other children (a 2-year-old and a 14-month-old) and there was no hint of Petitioner 
abusing or neglecting these other children, who were in the room with [the baby] when he died. 
Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 259. Smith, 437 F.3d at 887. Notwithstanding this observation, it is important to note that SBS-
based convictions in the absence of retinal hemorrhages are routinely affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., 
People v. Jackson, No. D049865, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9866 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2007); 
State v. Humphries, No. 06CA00156, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 315 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2008).  
 260. Smith, 437 F.3d at 887.  
 261. The only external injury was ―recent small abrasion, approximately 1/16 by 3/16 of an inch, 
on the lower skull, upper neck region, and a recent bruise beneath this abrasion.‖ Id.  
 262. Id. at 886.  
 263. Smith apparently told police that she had given the baby a ―jostle‖ to rouse him and 
responded, ―Oh my God, Did I do it?‖ to a social worker when informed that the baby had died of 
shaking. Id. at 889 n.11. 
 264. Id. at 890.  
 265. Jackson v. Virginia, requires courts to determine whether ―after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319. The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) even more ―severely restricts‖ the scope of 
review of state court decisions, as it ―mandates that [courts] apply the standards of Jackson with an 
additional layer of deference . . . and only grant habeas relief where the state court‘s adjudication of a 
Jackson claim is objectively unreasonable.‖ Smith v. Mitchell, 453 F.3d 1203, 1203–06 (9th Cir. 
2006) (Bea, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).  
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demonstrable support for shaking as the cause of death . . . . [T]here has 
very likely been a miscarriage of justice in this case.‖266  
The court‘s reasoning in this regard is instructive on when a deficiency 
in proof rises to the level requiring reversal:  
All of the prosecution witnesses based their opinion of Shaken Baby 
Syndrome on their hypothesis that violent shaking had torn or sheared 
the brain stem in an undetectable way[
267
] . . . . [A]nd they reached this 
conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain itself of the 
cause of death. Thus . . . the tearing might have occurred or it might 
not have occurred; there simply was no evidence to permit an expert 
conclusion one way or the other on the point. This is simply not the 
stuff from which guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can be established 
. . . .
268
 
The improbability of a court substituting its view of the sufficiency of 
the evidence for the jury‘s in this manner—and of that ruling being left 
intact—is indicated by Smith‘s highly unusual procedural path. The 
defendant‘s conviction was affirmed by the state appellate court.269 The 
California Supreme Court denied review.
270
 The federal magistrate judge 
recommended that the habeas petition be denied and the district court 
denied the petition.
271
 After the three-judge panel reversed this denial and 
the full court voted to deny a petition for rehearing en banc, a number of 
 
 
 266. Smith, 437 F.3d at 890. ―With all due respect to the California Court of Appeal, and even 
with the additional layer of deference mandated by AEDPA, we conclude that the Court of Appeal 
unreasonably applied Jackson when it held the evidence to be sufficient to convict Smith of causing 
[the child‘s] death.‖ Id.  
 267. See infra note 268 (further discussing disputed significance of lack of visible shearing in 
brain stem).  
 268. Smith, 437 F.3d at 890. A number of Ninth Circuit judges criticized the panel for ―adopt[ing] 
the defense experts‘ view of what physical evidence is necessary to support a valid diagnosis of shaken 
baby syndrome.‖ Smith, 453 F.3d at 1207 (Bea, J., dissenting). The judges who would have affirmed 
Smith‘s conviction had a very different view of the evidence against her: 
The physicians called by the prosecution reached their conclusion despite the lack of visible 
shearing, not because of it, and explained why. Indeed, what provided the basis for the doctors‘ 
opinions was the evidence of recent trauma to [the child‘s] brain: (1) the subdural hemorrhaging; 
(2) the subarachnoid hemorrhaging; (3) the hemorrhaging around the optic nerves; (4) the blood 
clot between the hemispheres of [the child‘s] brain; and (5) the bruise and abrasion at the lower 
back of [the child‘s] head. The prosecution‘s experts considered and rejected other causes of [the 
child‘s] death . . . . Since none of these alternate theories explained [the child‘s] death, the 
prosecution‘s doctors opined that [he] died from violent shaking, as evidenced by the trauma. 
Id. at 1206.  
 269. Id.  
 270. Id.  
 271. Id.  
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judges wrote to dissent bitterly.
272
 The United States Supreme Court then 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for 
further consideration
273
 in light of a recent decision elaborating on the 
standard applicable to federal habeas review of a state court affirmance of 
conviction.
274
 After the Ninth Circuit reinstated its earlier judgment and 
opinion,
275
 the state once again petitioned the Supreme Court for review.
276
 
This petition is currently pending as this Article goes to print.
277
 
Now compare Smith to the far more typical case of Drancy Deshann 
Jackson, whose conviction was recently affirmed on direct appeal by a 
California court.
278
 Jackson is currently serving a prison term of thirteen 
years for felony child abuse.
279
 The medical evidence consisted of 
subdural hemorrhaging and diffuse brain swelling—no retinal 
hemorrhages, no other injuries—which prosecution experts diagnosed as 
 
 
 272. Id. (―[T]he opinion is inaccurate.‖); id. at 1207–08 (―Under our court‘s approach, a federal 
court of appeals may, effectively, set aside an expert opinion where it conflicts with the views of the 
other side‘s experts.‖).  
 273. Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007). 
 274. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).  
 275. Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 2007). The court‘s rationale for reinstating the 
opinion is emphatic:  
Nothing in the State‘s failure of evidence takes this case out of the class of cases subject to the test 
of Jackson. Unlike Musladin . . . this case presents merely one more instance where the evidence 
presented by a state is wholly insufficient to permit a constitutional conviction. Jackson makes 
clear that such cases cannot constitutionally stand if the evidence was insufficient ―to convince a 
trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.‖ . . . 
Jackson makes clear that a conviction is unconstitutional even if there is some evidence of guilt 
when all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, does not permit 
any rational fact-finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith‘s case accordingly falls 
squarely within Jackson. Moreover, the prosecution‘s evidence falls so far short that it was 
unreasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that it met the Jackson standard. 
Id. at 1258–59 (citations omitted).  
 276. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Patrick v. Smith, No. 07-1483 (9th Cir. May 27, 2008).  
 277. Whether the Court decides to review the case may depend on its assessment of the following 
reasoning advanced by the Ninth Circuit:  
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court has never had a case where the issue was whether the 
evidence, expert and otherwise, was constitutionally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a defendant had shaken an infant to death. But there are an infinite number of potential 
factual scenarios in which the evidence may be insufficient to meet constitutional standards. Each 
scenario theoretically could be construed artfully to constitute a class of one. If there is to be any 
federal habeas review of constitutional sufficiency of the evidence as required by Jackson, 
however, [AEPDA] cannot be interpreted to require a Supreme Court decision to be factually 
identical to the case in issue before habeas can be granted on the ground of unreasonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court does not interpret AEDPA in such a 
constrained manner.  
Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d at 1259.  
 278. People v. Jackson, No. D049865, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9866 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 
2007).  
 279. Id. at *1.  
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SBS.
280
 The defendant‘s account—that the baby fell from the couch where 
he had been propped with a bottle—was dismissed as ―inconsistent‖ with 
the observed symptoms.
281
 
The defense presented evidence that Jackson was an ―excellent parent 
who never abused or hit his children or any other child for whom [he] was 
the caretaker.‖282 The baby‘s pediatrician testified that ―there was no 
evidence [the baby] had been abused‖ prior to the incident in question.283 
The sole defense expert, a biomechanical engineer, questioned the 
scientific basis for SBS.
284
 Citing research showing that short-distance 
falls can cause subdural hematomas, he also noted ―that it was an open 
question whether an earlier injury could make the child more susceptible 
to injury from a second fall.‖285 
Applying the familiar standard of review,
286
 the appellate court 
determined that:  
[t]he conflict among the experts‘ opinions . . . did not render the 
evidence insufficient. . . . In finding [against the defendant], the jury 
necessarily rejected his experts‘ contention . . . . The credibility and 
weight of the expert testimony was for the jury to determine, and it is 
not up to us to reevaluate it. The jury could reasonably believe the 
evidence of the prosecution witnesses and reject that of the defense 
witness.
287
 
 
 
 280. Id. at *4–5. Other prosecutions have gone forward on the basis of subdural hematomas alone. 
See, e.g., People v. Collier, No. A120808, 2009 WL 389721 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2009) (affirming 
conviction). Prosecutors have also proceeded on the basis of retinal hemhorrages (without subdural 
hematoma). See, e.g., Hess v. Tilton, No. CIV S-07-0909, 2009 WL 577661 (E.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 2009) 
(affirming conviction). 
 281. Jackson, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9866, at *13. 
 282. Id. at *8. 
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. at *5–6.  
 285. Id. at *6. 
 286. The standard was described in Jackson as follows: 
When reviewing a claim attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the 
question we ask is ―whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt.‖ As an appellate court, we ―‗must view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 
reasonably deduce from the evidence.‘‖ . . . A conviction will not be reversed for insufficient 
evidence unless it appears ―that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 
evidence to support [the conviction].‖ . . . ―If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of 
fact‘s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably 
reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.‖ 
Id. at *9–10 (citations omitted).  
 287. Id. at *13 (citations omitted).  
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As the reasoning of the Jackson court evinces, the legal framework 
governing sufficiency challenges seems to virtually preordain this result.
288
 
Credibility determinations are within the province of the jury; when the 
testimony of defense experts is rejected, that rejection must be afforded 
deference by the appeals court. Provided that the prosecution experts 
testify in a manner that reasonably justifies a finding of guilt, the 
conviction is affirmed.
289
  
In short, a conflict in expert opinions is functionally irrelevant to the 
disposition of sufficiency challenges. Given this, the legal landscape will 
not be appreciably altered by a louder chorus of SBS skeptics, but by 
continued movement in this direction on the part of the SBS faithful. If the 
testimony of prosecution experts comes to reflect the scientific limitations 
of a triad-based diagnosis of abuse, a court may well conclude that 
evidence of SBS is ―not the stuff from which guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt can be established. . . .‖290  
Even in the midst of continued scientific controversy, this judicial shift 
may yet occur.
291
 Despite deep tensions within the competing opinions,
292
 
Smith suggests that the trial record must contain evidence of a sufficient 
quantum and caliber. According to the Ninth Circuit, habeas relief was 
warranted because ―[a]n expert‘s testimony as to a theoretical conclusion 
or inference does not rescue a case that suffers from an underlying 
 
 
 288. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see Thomas v. State, No. 03-07-00646-CR, 2009 
WL 1364348, at *7 (Tex. App. May 14, 2009) (―Sharply conflicting evidence was presented regarding 
the scientific basis of shaken baby syndrome and, consequently, the diagnosis of the State‘s witnesses 
. . . . Once admitted, this conflicting evidence presents an issue for the jury to resolve.‖). The same is 
true of manifest weight challenges. See State v. Humphries, No. 06CA0015b, 2008 Ohio App LEXIS 
315, at *23–24 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2008) (―[A] conviction is not against the manifest weight of the 
evidence solely because the jury heard inconsistent testimony.‖) (internal quotations omitted). In 
Humphries, the court affirmed the child endangerment conviction of Latasha Humphries for the death 
of her child, whose SBS diagnosis was based on subdural hematoma and cerebral edema alone. Id. at 
*12. Humphries was identified as the perpetrator based on a perceived impossibility of a lucid interval, 
as well as the defendant‘s ―fail[ure] to provide a reasonable explanation for [the child‘s] injuries. . . .‖ 
Id. at *22. Only one expert testified on behalf of the defendant. Id. at *2. See supra note 231 (noting 
significance of presenting more than one expert). The opinion references marijuana use, Humphries, 
2008 Ohio App. Lexis, at *5, the defendant‘s status as an unmarried mother, and the impoverished 
environment in which the child was being raised (e.g., ―dingy one piece pajamas,‖ crib missing one 
side, id. at *9–10)—factors which may well have disadvantaged Humphries at trial and on appeal.  
 289. As Samuel Gross has observed in the civil context, ―traditionally courts have held that the 
testimony of any qualified expert is sufficient to sustain a verdict on any issue on which she testified.‖ 
Gross, supra note 253, at 252. 
 290. Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 291. In what may indicate an overall trend in this direction, trial consultant Toni Blake noted that, 
in 2007, ―‗we saw one of these cases overturned about once a month.‘‖ Anderson, supra note 55.  
 292. See supra notes 268, 272 and accompanying text.  
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insufficiency of evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.‖293 But 
the ―absence of evidence‖294 cited by the court—an absence which ―cannot 
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt‖295—is, more precisely, an 
absence of evidence worthy of conviction. Identifying the qualitative 
judgment embodied in this determination is not to indict it. After all, even 
the ―rational trier of fact‖ to whom courts are deferring must have certain 
standards.
296
 In triad-only SBS cases, judges willing to assess the value of 
the state‘s evidence, as the court did in Smith, may conclude that an 
absence of evidence has convicted others.  
E. Post-Conviction Proceedings  
1. Edmunds 
In early 2007, the judge who presided over Audrey Edmunds‘s trial 
over a decade earlier conducted a five-day evidentiary hearing in support 
of her motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The 
defense experts
297
 testified that, since the mid-1990s, ―significant research 
has undermined the scientific foundations for SBS, creating substantial 
challenges to matters that were nearly universally accepted in the medical 
community at the time of Edmunds‘s trial.‖298  
According to the defense experts, a still-emerging body of literature 
had cast new doubt on previously accepted medical dogma.
299
 Now in 
dispute: whether shaking alone can cause the constellation of injuries 
associated with SBS;
300
 whether a specific mechanism for the injuries (i.e., 
shaking) can be accurately identified;
301
 whether considerable force, as 
opposed to a minor impact, is necessary to cause the injuries associated 
with the syndrome;
302
 whether previously unrecognized mimics of child 
abuse can cause the triad of symptoms said to be pathognomonic of 
 
 
 293. Smith, 437 F.3d at 890 (emphasis added). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 885. 
 297. The following physicians testified as experts for the defense: the chief of pediatric 
neuroradiology at Stanford‘s Children‘s Hospital; the former Chief Medical Examiner for Kentucky; a 
forensic pathologist; a pediatrician; an ophthalmologist; and the autopsy pathologist who testified at 
Edmunds‘s trial as a prosecution witness. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Days One and Two), 
State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (2008) (No. 96 CF 555). 
 298. Brief of Defendant, supra note 4, at 11.  
 299. Id. at 3 (―[T]he science that sent Audrey Edmunds to prison did not stand still.‖).  
 300. Id. at 13–16. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. at 20.  
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abusive head trauma;
303
 and whether the occurrence of the type of head 
trauma leading to serious brain damage inevitably causes immediate 
unconsciousness.
304
 
The defense experts testified that ―in 1996 they themselves would have 
testified as the State‘s experts had at Edmunds‘s trial,‖305 but the evolving 
science had changed their opinions as to the likely cause of death.
306
 In 
short, the scientific foundation for concluding beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Edmunds had shaken Natalie Beard to death was no longer intact.
307
 
The near unanimity that once characterized the medical establishment‘s 
understanding of SBS had been shattered.
308
 Yet no new medical accord 
had been reconstituted in its place.
309
 Against this disquieting backdrop, 
Audrey Edmunds‘s new trial motion was decided.  
 
 
 303. Id. at 16–20. 
 304. Id. at 20–23. 
 305. Id. at 11. 
 306. Regarding the particular circumstances of Natalie‘s death, the defense experts testified that 
the evidence upon which Edmunds was convicted had been undermined by a number of scientific 
developments: studies using biomechanical models, animal models, and computer simulations 
suggested that Natalie‘s brain injuries could not have been caused by shaking alone; even if Natalie‘s 
death were caused by trauma (i.e., impact), considerably less force than previously suspected could 
have caused her injuries; new research had uncovered a number of causes of the retinal hemorrhages 
which, at trial, were said to conclusively prove that Natalie had been shaken; emerging science 
revealed that chronic subdural hematomas—like the one discovered at Natalie‘s autopsy—may re-
bleed with little precipitation, causing further brain injury; the differential diagnosis (a range of 
possible explanations for Natalie‘s injuries other than abusive head trauma) had evolved considerably 
in recent years; and, finally, the evidence thought to be dispositive on the timing of injuries was 
contradicted by a number of ―lucid interval‖ studies, undermining past certainty that Natalie was 
injured during the hour that she was in Edmunds‘ care. Id. at 14–23. 
 307.  The appellate court summarized the evidentiary record of the post-conviction hearing as 
follows:  
Edmunds presented evidence that was not discovered until after her conviction, in the form of 
expert medical testimony, that a significant and legitimate debate in the medical community has 
developed in the past ten years over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone, 
whether an infant may suffer head trauma and yet experience a significant lucid interval prior to 
death, and whether other causes may mimic the symptoms traditionally viewed as indicating 
shaken baby or shaken impact syndrome. Edmunds could not have been negligent in seeking this 
evidence, as the record demonstrates that the bulk of the medical research and literature supporting 
the defense position, and the emergence of the defense theory as a legitimate position in the 
medical community, only emerged in the ten years following her trial. 
State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 15. 
 308. Even the state‘s experts acknowledged, to varying degrees, that scientific consensus about 
SBS had changed since the mid-1990s. See State v. Edmunds, No. 96 CF 555, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Cir. 
Ct. Mar. 29, 2007) (―Expert witnesses on both sides now indicate that research about Shaken Baby 
Syndrome has evolved . . . .‖); supra Part III.B.  
 309. The defense experts maintained that Natalie‘s death was caused by some combination of 
violent shaking and impact, and that this trauma could only have been inflicted immediately prior to 
the onset of unmistakable and severe neurological damage. Brief Plaintiff-Respondent at 35–37, State 
v. Edmunds, 746 N.W. 2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (No. 2007AP000933) [hereinafter ―State‘s brief‖].  
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While expressly acknowledging that ―[s]tanding alone and 
unchallenged, the defense witnesses provide[d] a sufficient evidentiary 
basis to order a new trial based upon newly discovered medical 
evidence,‖310 the trial judge denied the motion. But an appellate court 
reversed this decision and concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood 
that a different result would be reached at a new trial.
311
  
In a remarkable opinion without judicial precedent, the court noted the 
―shift in mainstream medical opinion since the time of Edmunds‘s trial.‖312 
While there were ―now competing medical opinions as to how Natalie‘s 
injuries arose and . . . the new evidence does not completely dispel the old 
evidence,‖313 the court was persuaded that ―the emergence of a legitimate 
and significant dispute within the medical community as to the cause of 
those injuries that constitutes newly discovered evidence.‖314 According to 
the appeals court,  
[at trial,] the State was able to easily overcome Edmunds‘s argument 
that she did not cause Natalie‘s injuries by pointing out that the jury 
would have to disbelieve the medical experts in order to have a 
reasonable doubt as to Edmunds‘s guilt. Now, a jury would be faced 
with competing credible medical opinions in determining whether 
there is a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds‘s guilt. Thus, we conclude 
 
 
 310. Edmunds, No. 96 CF 555, slip op. at 6 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007). Nevertheless, the court 
engaged in a deliberate balancing of the defense evidence against the evidence offered by the state in 
rebuttal. After having ―look[ed] at all the evidence from the trial as well as the evidence presented by 
both sides on defendant‘s motion for a new trial,‖ it concluded that ―[t]he newly discovered evidence 
presented by the defense is significantly outweighed by the evidence presented by the prosecution.‖ Id. 
at *10–11. 
 311. The appellate court held that the trial judge had incorrectly applied the law, and that this error 
constituted an abuse of discretion:  
After determining that both parties presented credible evidence, it was not the court‘s role to 
weigh the evidence. Instead, once the circuit court found that Edmunds‘s newly discovered 
medical evidence was credible, it was required to determine whether there was a reasonable 
probability that a jury, hearing all the medical evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to 
Edmunds‘s guilt. This question is not answered by a determination that the State‘s evidence was 
stronger. . . . [A] jury could have a reasonable doubt as to a defendant‘s guilt even if the State‘s 
evidence is stronger.  
Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 18, 746 N.W. 2d 590, ¶ 18. Noting that the trial judge had already made 
its credibility determinations, the appeals court proceeded to apply the correct legal standard itself 
rather than remand the case. Id. ¶ 19. On April 14, 2008, Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the petition 
for review. State v. Edmunds, 749 N.W.2d 663 (Wis. 2008).  
 312. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 23, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 23. 
 313. Id. ―Indeed, the debate between the defense and State experts reveals a fierce disagreement 
between forensic pathologists, who now question whether the symptoms Natalie displayed indicate 
intentional head trauma, and pediatricians, who largely adhere to the science as presented at 
Edmunds‘s trial.‖ Id. 
 314. Id. 
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that the record establishes that there is a reasonable probability that a 
jury, looking at both the new medical testimony and the old medical 
testimony, would have a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds‘s guilt.315 
Audrey Edmunds was granted a new trial.
316
 Months later, all charges 
against her were dismissed.
317
  
2. Beyond Edmunds 
Enormous procedural and substantive hurdles confront defendants at 
the post-conviction stage.
318
 Although the law differs depending on 
jurisdiction, a number of generalizations can be made about the SBS 
defendant‘s burden of proof. Put simply, there are tensions between the 
governing framework for collateral relief and the issues presented by SBS 
cases.
319
 These strains were nicely illustrated by the state‘s arguments 
against post-conviction relief in Edmunds.  
First, the evidence presented at the post-conviction stage must be 
deemed new, or ―discovered‖ after the trial.320 One problem for the 
 
 
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.  
 317. On July 11, 2008, the state announced its decision to dismiss charges against Edmunds. Ed 
Trevelen, Citing Wishes of Baby’s Parents, Prosecutors Won’t Retry Edmunds, WIS. STATE J., July 11, 
2008.  
 318. This discussion is confined to newly discovered evidence claims, which are most relevant to 
SBS cases given the trajectory of the underlying science. ―[E]very state currently permits at least some 
form of post-trial relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence.‖ Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River 
Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 659 (2005) (citing 1 Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., State Postconviction Remedies and 
Relief: With Forms, 1–13, at 55–58 (2001) (all states provide a direct remedy in the form of a new trial 
motion based on newly discovered evidence). Newly discovered evidence ―represents a ground for 
relief through the principal state post-conviction remedies in thirty-two states.‖ Id. at 682.  
 Apart from Edmunds, I am aware of only two SBS cases where post-conviction relief was granted. 
In each, murder charges were ultimately dismissed, albeit on somewhat different grounds. One 
defendant‘s conviction was overturned in 2004 based on the discovery of flaws in the autopsy. Dad 
Freed from Life Sentence in Son’s Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Aug. 28, 2004, at A1, available 
at http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2004/09/18/yurko-case.aspx. That same year, 
charges against another defendant were dismissed by a newly elected District Attorney after an 
extensive review of ―new evidence that point[ed] to reasonable doubt.‖ Maura Dolan, Fatal Abuse or 
Tragedy Compounded?, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A1. 
 319. I focus here on the legal standards applicable to these claims, as opposed to the formidable 
procedural barriers to collateral relief. These barriers have been criticized by Professor Daniel 
Medwed, who has proposed reforms targeted at greater systemic embrace of newly discovered non-
DNA evidence, including abolishing statute of limitations, allowing innocence claims to be heard by a 
new judge, and creating a de novo standard of appellate review for summary dismissals of newly 
discovered evidence motions. Medwed, supra note 318, at 686–715. 
 320. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 13, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 13. Related to this is the requirement 
that the defendant‘s failure to discover the evidence is not the result of negligence, which raises issues 
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defense is that the proffered evidence is less definitive than past ―scientific 
improvement[s]‖321—DNA typing, primarily.322 In Edmunds, the 
prosecutor underscored this point: the defense could offer no ―bone test 
. . . [that] would tell us whether that infant was . . . the subject of [shaking-
inflicted] brain injury.‖323 Instead, the evidence was described as ―an 
academic debate among medical experts,‖324 and one the prosecution 
characterized as ongoing at the time of the trial in order to negate a 
showing of ―newness.‖325 For instance, the article widely recognized as the 
―classic that really set this all in motion about doubting shaking,‖326 was 
published in 1987,
327
 and a small number of scientists were already 
questioning the basis for SBS in the early 1990s.
328
 The state thus argued 
that ―[t]he debate . . . was fully engaged‖ at the time of trial.329 Although 
the court rejected this characterization,
330
 future defendants collaterally 
attacking their convictions may have greater difficulty satisfying the 
―newly discovered‖ requirement if the evidence offered as ―new‖ at the 
post-conviction stage was more fully developed when the trial occurred.
331
  
                                                                                                                         
 
similar to those presented by the ―newly discovered‖ standard. Id. See infra notes 323–33 and 
accompanying text.  
 321. Attorney for State in Transcript of Oral Arguments (Day 5) at 69, State v. Edmunds, 746 
N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2007) (No. 96 CF 555).  
 322. Defendants making newly discovered evidence motions face impediments to relief that are 
very much situated against the backdrop of DNA exonerations. See infra notes 343–50 and 
accompanying text (DNA as paradigm of newly discovered evidence).  
 323. Attorney for State in Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 321, at 69. 
 324. State‘s brief, supra note 309, at 17. Compare id. at 17 (―Edmunds‘ newly discovered 
evidence claim is a ‗non-starter‘ because, despite two days of expert testimony, she failed to present 
clear and convincing evidence of anything ‗new‘ here.‖) with Defendant‘s brief, supra note 4, at 35–36 
(―The new evidence demonstrates that the scientific basis for SBS theory is under serious challenge.‖). 
 325. State‘s brief, supra note 306, at 18–22. 
 326. Barnes testimony, Evidentiary Hearing (Day One), supra note 71, at 97 (referencing 
Duhaime study, supra note 120). 
 327. Duhaime, supra note 120.  
 328. At least one physician, Dr. John Plunkett, has been doing so for decades. Telephone 
Interview with John Plunkett, supra note 41; Interview with Thomas Bohan, supra note 78.  
 329. State‘s brief, supra note 309, at 21. 
 330. ―While there may have been strands of disagreement about Shaken Baby Syndrome present 
in 1996, studies, research, debate and articles about the concept have grown exponentially since the 
trial . . . . All the defense experts indicated they would have agreed with the prosecution‘s theory if 
they had been testifying in 1996.‖ State v. Edmunds, No. 96 CF 555, slip op. at 6 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
29, 2007). The appellate court affirmed this aspect of the ruling. See supra note 307. 
 331. Edmunds, unlike most defendants requesting post-conviction relief, was also able to point to 
the fact that the autopsy pathologist retracted important portions of his trial testimony. See Defendant‘s 
brief, supra note 4, at 24 (―Perhaps most significantly, Dr. Huntingon retracted key parts of his 1996 
testimony—both on the certainty that Natalie was shaken, and the assessment that there could have 
been no significant lucid interval.‖); supra note 115 (explaining basis for Huntington‘s conversion).  
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Second, the evidence must be material to the case and not merely 
cumulative.
332
 The prosecution in Edmunds asserted that the ―academic 
debate‖ about SBS was ―beside the point‖:333 theoretical disagreements 
about whether shaking alone could cause death and whether the triad alone 
was pathognomonic of abuse were irrelevant to Edmunds‘s conviction, 
given the severity of the infant‘s injuries.334 The court could dispense with 
this argument in short order,
335
 given that the prosecution fell squarely 
within the SBS paradigm—the cause of death was said to be forceful 
shaking, the diagnosis was made on the basis of the classic triad,
336
 and the 
perpetrator was identified based on the impossibility of a lucid interval.
337
 
But given the current state of scientific research, which (unlike DNA
338
) 
cannot conclusively establish a defendant‘s innocence, deviations from 
this prototypical fact pattern will tend to undermine the defendant‘s 
materiality claim.  
Finally, the evidence must probably have resulted in a different verdict 
at trial.
339
 This is the most difficult burden for the defense,
340
 and was 
predictably the greatest area of contention in the Edmunds post-conviction 
relief proceedings.
341
 The defense argued to the court that, at trial,  
[t]he jury never had any reason to doubt that diagnosis of shaking, 
with or without impact, and nearly immediate collapse was 
unassailable as medical evidence. This is simply no longer true . . . . 
[T]his new evidence of evolving science that rigorously challenges 
 
 
 332. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 13, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 13. 
 333. State‘s brief, supra note 309, at 33. 
 334. ―The severity of the injuries sustained by Natalie takes this case out of the classic ‗triad‘ 
mold. Not only did Natalie sustain retinal bleeding, she sustained retinal folds and retinoschisis.‖ Id. at 
27.  
 335. ―The evidence is material to an issue in the case because the main issue at trial was the cause 
of Natalie‘s injuries, and the new medical testimony presents an alternate theory for the source of those 
injuries.‖ Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 15. 
 336. According to prosecution experts, differences between retinal hemorrhages—in terms of 
extent, location, and pattern—are significant. See, e.g., Testimony of Alex Levin in Transcript of 
Evidentiary Hearing (Day Four), supra note 129, at 99–101.  
 337. Defendant‘s brief, supra note 4, at 40 (―[T]he science was the whole case, and new research 
seriously challenges the foundations of the scientific case‖).  
 338. See infra notes 343–51 and accompanying text (discussing DNA as ―new evidence‖ 
paradigm).  
 339. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 13, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 13. 
 340. See State‘s brief, supra note 309, at 16 (―‗[T]he hardest requirement to meet is that the 
offered evidence in view of the other evidence would have probably resulted in an acquittal.‘‖ (quoting 
Lock v. State, 142 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. 1966)).  
 341. ―The real crux of the dispute in this case is whether the new expert medical testimony 
Edmunds offers establishes a reasonable probability that a different result would be reached in a new 
trial.‖ Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 16, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 16. Here the trial judge sided with the 
state. See supra note 310.  
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and refutes long-presumed hypotheses . . . very well could change the 
outcome. . . .
342
  
In refuting this notion, the prosecutor explicitly juxtaposed the 
scientific attacks on SBS with the certainty of DNA exonerations. Unlike 
the new debate offered by the defense, DNA was ―real science‖ that 
established innocence ―to an astronomical degree of science (sic) or 
statistical probability.‖343 DNA did not ―dispute a theory or demonstrate a 
rift or a contention in the scientific community. It didn‘t provide for 
alternative hypotheses.‖344 In contrast to defense evidence substantiating 
the existence of lucid intervals, DNA samples ―exclude[d] the defendant 
from the world of possible perpetrators.‖345 And unlike testimony 
regarding possible alternative causes of death in Edmunds, DNA provided 
definitive answers.
346
  
As the Edmunds arguments show, DNA has implicitly been positioned 
as the paradigm of newly discovered evidence. Although the appeals court 
ultimately rejected the prosecutor‘s arguments, DNA‘s reign as the ―poster 
child of newly discovered evidence‖ motions347 must be reckoned with. 
The level of certitude DNA provides has become a de facto 
―benchmark,‖348 and the actual innocence it establishes is a touchstone for 
post-conviction relief.
349
 As a consequence, legal standards may be 
formulated and applied in ways that tend to disadvantage other types of 
proof. As a matter of law, DNA is not the benchmark
350
 and actual 
 
 
 342. Attorney for the Defense in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 115, at 58. 
 343. Attorney for the Prosecution in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 321, at 65.  
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 105.  
 346. The prosecutor in Edmunds argued this point as follows: ―Is there an enzyme that still exists 
in the bones of this deceased child that will tell us if she was the subject of rotational acceleration-
deceleration injury that killed her? No.‖ Attorney for the Defense in Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 115, at 88.  
 347. Attorney for the Prosecution in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 321, at 64–65. 
 348. Id. at 88.  
 349. An emerging scholarly literature explores the post-DNA meanings of ―actual innocence‖ and 
―wrongful conviction‖ and considers the conceptual, strategic, and practical implications that follow. 
See generally Gross, supra note 139; Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. 
REV. 5 (2008); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237 (2006); Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus 
on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005); 
Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of 
Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219 (2005); Margaret 
Raymond, The Problem With Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (2001).  
 350. Edmunds‘s attorney emphasized this:  
Yes, the DNA evidence can absolutely prove that somebody did not commit a crime and can 
absolutely prove somebody else did commit the crime, but that is not to say that that‘s what you 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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innocence is not the sine qua non of a new trial. But the subjectivity 
inherent in predicting the effect of new evidence on a jury‘s 
deliberations
351
 means that the litigation of post-conviction relief motions 
will continue to take place in the shadow of DNA.  
Given these formidable obstacles, the trial court‘s denial of Edmunds‘s 
motion
352
 was to be expected. In the decision, we may rightly discern that 
similarly situated defendants will have difficulty prevailing in the 
future.
353
 Perhaps more surprising is that the trial court‘s decision was 
overturned on appeal.
354
 This development portends hope for those 
seeking new trials in SBS cases.  
Even so, the promise of Edmunds is closely circumscribed by its 
limited precedential effect.
355
 Beyond onerous post-conviction relief 
standards,
356
 defendants seeking collateral relief in SBS cases confront the 
likelihood that, in coming years, the current scientific controversy will be 
suspended in a kind of equilibrium. At some point, unless a revolutionary 
breakthrough fatally undermines SBS, defendants convicted in this era of 
uncertainty will be hard-pressed to claim that evidence of the diagnosis‘s 
                                                                                                                         
 
have to have in order to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. That‘s a real red 
herring here. That‘s a much higher standard than the clearly established legal standard under the 
case law. 
Attorney for the Defense in Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 115, at 135.  
 351. Daniel Medwed has observed generally that  
non-DNA cases are difficult for defendants to overturn . . . given the subjectivity involved in 
assessing most forms of new evidence and the absence of a method to prove innocence to a 
scientific certainty. This inherent difficulty in litigating innocence claims predicated on newly 
discovered non-DNA evidence is exacerbated by the structural design of most state post-
conviction regimes . . . . 
Medwed, supra note 318, at 658. Professor Medwed helpfully summarizes these collateral relief 
regimes. Id. at 681–86.  
 352. See supra notes 310–11 and accompanying text. 
 353. Edmunds was represented by Professor Keith Findley and the Wisconsin Innocence Project, a 
clinical program of the University of Wisconsin Law School whose mission is described at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/index.html. It is worth noting that the Innocence Project, like 
others of its kind, has more resources, greater access to experts, and more extensive research 
capabilities than what is available to most defendants seeking post-conviction relief.  
 354. See supra notes 311–16 and accompanying text. Although he denied the defendant‘s motion, 
the trial judge‘s factual findings were particularly helpful to Edmunds on appeal. Id.  
 355. This is an inevitable feature of federalized system of justice. Where Edmunds is controlling, 
however, its impact may prove significant. See Shaken-Baby Ruling Worries Prosecutor, WIS. STATE 
J., Feb. 29, 2008, at C3 (―[A] prosecutor says it will be virtually impossible to convict anyone who 
shakes a baby to death in Wisconsin if a recent court ruling stands.‖). 
 356. One response to these realities is resort to a review commission, which may be the most 
efficient way of dealing with the systemic nature of triad-based SBS convictions and their potential 
failings. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text (describing approaches of United Kingdom 
and Canada). 
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invalidity is new. Newly discovered evidence motions will be effectively 
foreclosed without ever having become truly viable.
357
  
This prospect would be somewhat less problematic if, throughout the 
criminal process, a systemic assimilation of the evolved science was 
underway. As we have seen, however, it is not.  
V. CONCLUSION 
SBS is a case study in the intersection of science and law, and the 
distorting influence that each may have on the other.  
The construction and persistence of SBS raises the distinct possibility 
that our adversarial system of criminal justice may be corrupting science. 
It may do so by placing pressure on scientists to articulate opinions more 
extreme—and certainly with more confidence—than those they actually 
hold.
358
 And it may do so by raising the stakes for those who have testified 
in court, under oath, to their version of scientific reality. 
The natural course of scientific evolution has resolved many past 
medical conflicts. In the case of SBS, as well, ongoing research could 
ultimately answer the open questions.
359
 New technological developments 
 
 
 357. As the evolutionary trajectory of the science progresses and newly discovered evidence 
motions become obsolete, defendants whose trial lawyers failed to mount a substantial challenge to 
now-suspect medical orthodoxy will assert that their representation was ineffective. Keith Findley has 
articulated this point as follows:  
where the medical evidence is ‗new‘ in the ordinary sense—that is, the jury at trial never heard the 
medical evidence—but not new in the legal sense—it existed and could have been presented at 
trial—the defendant‘s claim will likely shift to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
on counsel‘s failure to marshal the available scientific evidence. 
E-mail from Keith Findley, Clinical Professor and Co-Director, Wisconsin Innocence Project, 
University of Wisconsin Law School to Deborah Tuerkheimer, Professor, University of Maine School 
of Law (Dec. 10, 2008, 17:52) (on file with author).  
 358. One pediatrician with whom I spoke elaborated on this point:  
the fact that we interact with lawyers and the court makes things worse. When you swear to tell 
the truth and nothing but the truth, are you swearing to speak only the truth, or to convey only the 
truth. Let‘s assume you believe you know the truth in the first place. You can only communicate 
in court through the artifices of the court by answering lawyers‘ questions that are purposely 
configured to structure and manipulate the truth. Within this venue, how do you deliver the 
―proper‖ concept into the minds of the jury, to whom you are trying to convey the truth. Some 
would assert that you should not reflect on uncertainties that you feel do not influence your 
ultimate opinion. You need to polarize your position, so that after cross and opposing witnesses, 
the jury lands in the middle where they belong. 
This pediatrician, who asked not to be named, later added: ―the urge to polarize your opinion 
significantly increase[s] when you are facing opposing ‗expert‘ opinion, which you consider to be 
hyper-polarized, incompletely reflective of the clinical case, scientifically incorrect or outright 
disingenuous.‖  
 359. My conversations with advocates on both sides of this debate can be generalized as follows. 
Those who believe that SBS is an invalid diagnosis cite ongoing research into the previously 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss1/1
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would facilitate this process. But SBS, from inception to current iteration, 
is fully embedded in the domain of law. This reality creates a special kind 
of urgency: around the country, murder convictions are resulting weekly 
from evidence that is a source of significant scientific controversy. Even if 
it were possible for research to progress on this front ―naturally‖—a 
dubious proposition given what has come before
360—organic processes 
take time, which, here, is of the essence. 
Even more untenable is the suggestion that this scientific dispute be 
decided in the courts. As the cautionary tale of SBS demonstrates, our 
adversarial, atomized system of justice, with its need for finality, is a poor 
forum for this debate. The institutional norms of science and law often 
collide; in this case, with tragic results. Without proper differentiation of 
their respective functions, both scientific certainty and individualized 
justice suffer.  
To the greatest extent possible, then, a comprehensive inquiry must 
take place apart from the fray.
361
 Perhaps only the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS)
362—or, even more fittingly, a similar undertaking by a 
newly created National Institute of Forensic Sciences
363—can provide this 
space. 
                                                                                                                         
 
undetected prevalence of retinal hemorrhages (by Patrick Lantz, among others) and subdural 
hemorrhages (by Ronnie Rooks, among others) as critical to resolving the debate. Defenders of the 
diagnosis point to better modeling and the possibility of capturing a shaking episode on film as the 
impetus for resolution. But see, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBsXA4H5Dzw (last visited July 
23, 2009) (shaking of an infant recorded on a ―nanny-cam;‖ baby was not injured). Of course if, in the 
future, shaking resulting in the classic SBS symptoms is recorded on video, this may tend to establish 
that shaking alone can cause the triad, but it will not prove a pathognomic relationship between 
shaking and the triad. Put differently, proof that A can cause B does not equate with proof that B is 
necessarily caused by A.  
 360. See supra Part III.A. 
 361. Others within the scientific community have been agitating for a neutral body to undertake a 
thorough study of the basis for SBS. See, e.g., Bohan, supra note 76 (calling this ―long past the time 
that persons capable of scientifically examining [the controversy surrounding the diagnosis] be called 
on to do so as part of an independent broad-based team under the auspices of the National Academies 
of Science;‖ Interview with Thomas Bohan, supra note 78. Even outside the SBS context, one 
commentator has recently argued that greater ―institutionalized oversight of forensic sciences, by 
scientists, is needed to compensate for the inadequacies of adversary adjudication.‖ Keith A. Findley, 
Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth,‖ 38 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 893, 955 (2008).  
 362. According to its own assessment, ―[t]he reports of the National Academies are viewed as 
being valuable and credible because of the Institution‘s reputation for providing independent, 
objective, and non-partisan advice with high standards of scientific and technical quality.‖ From 
National Academies: Our Study Process, http://www.nationalacademies.org/studycommitteprocess.pdf 
(last visited July 23, 2009). Within the scientific community, this seems to be a generally accepted 
characterization. A NAS study requires a federal agency as its primary financial sponsor, implicating 
the willingness of Congress to authorize funds for the endeavor. Id. 
 363. In February 2009, the National Research Council of the National Academies issued its much 
heralded report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, available at 
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In the meantime, until scientific consensus has been achieved, the 
criminal justice system must find its own solutions to the problem of a 
diagnosis already morphed and still in transition.  
To date, our system has failed. In place of adaptation, we have seen 
massive institutional inertia. Once the SBS prosecution paradigm became 
entrenched, the crime became reified. Deferential review standards and a 
quest for finality perpetuated the system‘s course. How expeditiously, and 
how deliberately, this course is righted will inform the meaning of 
justice.
364
  
Complicating the endeavor, SBS prosecutions raise discomfiting 
possibilities that diverge from those presented by the innocence archetype. 
Here, no other perpetrator can be held accountable; indeed, no crime at all 
may have occurred. The problem is not individual, but systemic, and its 
source is error, not corruption. Responsibility is diffuse: prosecutors and 
scientists may each legitimately point fingers. Most fundamentally, 
scientific developments have cast new doubt without yet creating certainty 
in its place. The story of SBS thus challenges current notions of wrongful 
convictions. Underlying conceptual frameworks must evolve accordingly.  
For now, we find ourselves situated in an extraordinary moment; one 
which tests our commitment to innocence that is not proven, but 
presumed.  
                                                                                                                         
 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12589 (last visited July 23, 2009). Although the NRC 
Report did not specifically address the problem of SBS, it did catalogue a wide range of ways in which 
―substantive information and testimony based on faulty forensic science analyses may have 
contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent people.‖ Id. at S-3. Perhaps most importantly, the 
Report recommended creation of a new independent federal agency, the National Institute of Forensic 
Science (NIFS), whose mission would encompass ―establishing and enforcing best practices for 
forensic science professionals;‖ ―developing a strategy to improve forensic science research and 
educational programs, including forensic pathology;‖ and ―promoting scholarly, competitive peer-
reviewed research . . . in the forensic science disciplines and forensic medicine.‖ Id. at S-14.  
 364. I pursue the question of reform in a future Article.  
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